Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-007 *11 January 1994*

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Further on Tudjman-Izetbegovic Talks in Bonn

Cease-Fire Reached; Draft Accord

LD1001184894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Excerpts] A few minutes ago, in a short telephone conversation with our Croatian Television correspondent, we learned that an urgent cease-fire in central Bosnia has been agreed. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] In response to a Croatian request that the Muslim offensive in central Bosnia be halted, an urgent cease-fire in central Bosnia was agreed. Generals Roso [Croat commander], Delic [Bosnian Muslim commander], and Briquemont are due to meet shortly. The Croatian side says this is a test for the overall solution of Croat-Muslim relations.

President Izetbegovic said after the two-hour latest round of the talks that he will order General Delic to implement an urgent cease-fire on all fronts in central Bosnia.

The two presidents may still continue their talks this evening in Petersberg castle in Bonn. The departure of the two delegations is scheduled for tomorrow.

The Muslim side undertook the obligation to reply to President Tudjman as to whether it accepts the draft agreement, which would have the binding character of a contract. The proposal, consisting of two parts, was made by Croatia. The signatories would be obligated to secure an urgent cease-fire, without any conditions, and the cessation of all hostilities.

President Tudjman proposed in the agreement that by 2400 on 15 January all hostilities must end between the Croat and Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The signatories would also take the obligation that all units observe humanitarian rules and the laws of war. Disbanding of disobedient units is also envisaged. War criminals would be handed over to courts.

The agreement envisages closing detention centers and releasing prisoners by 31 January. Muslim acceptance of the agreement would guarantee free passage of humanitarian convoys and humanitarian aid.

The equality of Bosnian Muslim and Croat people in all areas is envisaged, as are respect for all human rights and civil freedoms without any discrimination and under international control.

The agreement, which the Muslim side has to accept or refuse by 15 January, and which President Izetbegovic—as he said—will personally support at the Sarajevo Presidency, also envisages how mutual relations within the Union of Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be organized, with Croat and Muslim people exercising respect for each other.

The agreement demands 17.5 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and 33.33 percent for the Bosnian Muslim republic.

All contentious issues are to be resolved only in a peaceful, political way, without resorting to the use of force.

The town of Mostar will be administered by the European Union for up to two years, the agreement envisages. Mostar will be the capital of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. A separate agreement will secure the return of its citizens to the town.

An agreement on which the Muslims are to voice their opinion by 15 January envisages that if the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina disintegrates, there will be no changes to the borders between the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the Bosnian Muslim republic. These two republics could have special relations with Croatia if the Serbs break up the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Muslim republic would in that case have the right to join the Croatian state. I will read out several articles:

Article 8 says: Signatories to this document are agreed that they will secure for the Bosnian Muslim republic access to the sea in a way not threatening the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Croatia and interests of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, taking into consideration the needs and the justified interests of the Bosnian Muslim republic in a way that will ensure permanent cooperation.

The Republic of Croatia and the Union of the Republics of Bosnia- Herzegovina are to conclude—after an agreement on the set-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the international conference on former Yugoslavia has come into effect—agreements on the use of free port zones in the ports of Ploce and Rijeka, in accordance with principles and provisions of the UN convention on transit trade of land-locked countries, i.e. on the principles agreed upon in a draft agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina on board the Invincible.

In case the Union of the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina ceases to exist, the Republic of Croatia pledges that it will consider the Bosnian Muslim republic a successor to all rights and obligations stemming from the agreement on the use of free port zones.

Article 10 says: Signatories to this agreement guarantee that on the territory of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the Bosnian Muslim republic voluntary and safe return of all refugees to the place of their previous residence will be secured. They accept control and supervision by international bodies in the implementation of this obligation.

Article 15 says: The Republic of Croatia believes that in case the Serbs break up the Bosnia-Herzegovina union, it is possible and necessary in the view of protecting and realizing the interests of the Croat and the Bosnian

Muslim nations to set up an alliance between the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnian Muslim republic that will be of an economic and defensive nature. In that case, the Republic of Croatia is ready to set up an alliance of states that will have the following goals:

—securing permanent friendship and cooperation;

—securing economic and social development in the common economic area with the gradual creation of a common market, customs union, and coordination of monetary and financial policy with the final goal of creating a monetary union; and

—securing cooperation in the areas of jurisdiction and internal affairs, coordination of their common foreign policy, creation of a joint defense policy, and conclusion of an agreement on cooperation in the spheres of defense and security.

I have read out only a few important articles of the agreement. This would not be just an ordinary agreement. Alija Izetbegovic did not accept it straight away, because he linked it with the realization of some issues relating to the territorial settlement in central Bosnia, Mostar, and access to the sea.

We shall see 15 January whether the Muslims will accept President Tudjman's proposal. Let us just repeat at the end of this dispatch that the Croatian demand for the Muslim offensive to stop was replied to by an agreement on an immediate cease-fire in central Bosnia, while Generals Roso, Delic, and Briquemont are to meet immediately and issue adequate orders.

Croatian Map Includes Vitez, Busovaca

LD1001195394 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] During our news bulletin we received the details of the latest Croatian map proposal defining the demarcation between the Muslim and the Croat community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under this proposal, the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna would include, among other areas, Vitez, Busovaca, and Bugojno.

Granic Interviewed on Talks

LD1001201194 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Telephone interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic in Bonn by unidentified studio correspondent—live]

[Text] [Correspondent] Good evening.

[Granic] Good evening.

[Correspondent] Minister, what is most interesting is the 17.5 percent [of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina] that Croatia is asking for the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and here I can see some towns that would be included in the territorial division of that republic.

[Granic] During the latest negotiations in Brussels, the European Union accepted that the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna should have 17.5 percent of the territory. Croatia today put forward not only a contractual agreement on the settlement, a cease-fire, and the overall regulation of Croat-Muslim relations within the three-republic union, but also said that should the union disintegrate, an alliance of states between the Bosnian Muslim and the Croatian states will be created. As you can see, this map is a Croatian proposal for the settlement. You can also see that the Croatian side has made no concessions on Neum and that a very important economic and ethnic part of the Croat-populated area has been encompassed.

[Correspondent] Minister, please tell us whether negotiations are continuing, or are we now waiting for something to happen by 15 January.

[Granic] The Muslim side accepted this proposal with a great deal of interest. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic himself said he will support this proposal. What we discussed most was how to halt all offensive actions, particularly those carried out by Bosnian Muslim forces against central Bosnia. It should be also said that no agreement has been reached regarding a settlement in central Bosnia. Talks on Mostar are to continue in Medjugorje on Thursday. Talks on the final economic access to the sea are also continuing.

[Correspondent] Minister, please tell us the most interesting thing: An urgent cease-fire for central Bosnia has been agreed. How is this going to be done?

[Granic] In agreement with Mr. Akashi, Mr. Stoltenberg has already organized a meeting between the military commanders, Generals Roso and Delic. President Izetbegovic is to issue an order to General Delic to halt all offensive actions. The Croat side will strictly observe the cease-fire.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much, Minister.

Croatian Side Issues Statement

LD1101111494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The permanent mission of Croatia attached to the European Union [EU] in Brussels has issued a special statement in which it informs all members and the whole Union of the results of the Croatian-Muslim talks in Bonn.

The statement says that Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, supported the proposal made by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman concerning a cease-fire and the territorial delineation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslim side has not yet signed, and the Muslim side points out that talks should continue on some details.

The Croatian mission attached to the EU provides detailed information about the agreements reached at

the meeting—under UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] auspices—by the military commanders of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The statement lays special emphasis on the agreement that a meeting be held on 14 January in Medjugorje at which talks would be held on the establishment of an EU administration in Mostar. It also carries the whole proposal of President Tudjman put forward at the meeting in Bonn.

We recall that President Tudjman made the offer that by 15 January at 0000, all hostilities between the Croatian and the Muslim peoples must cease. The signatories would then bind themselves to adhering to humanitarian and international warfare law. It was envisaged that (?disobedient) formations would be disbanded and that war criminals would be tried. The agreement envisages the closure of prison camps and the release of prisoners by 31 January. Muslim accession to this agreement would guarantee the free passage of humanitarian convoys and humanitarian aid. The agreement envisages the regulation of relations in the Union of Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, accompanied by the mutual respect of the Croat and Muslim people.

The agreement seeks 17.5 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and 33.33 percent for the Bosniak Muslim republic. The town of Mostar would be under EU administration for up to two years. It would be the capital of Herceg-Bosna and the return of its citizens would be ensured by a special agreement.

The agreement—a statement on which will be issued by the Muslims by 15 January—envisages that if the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina falls apart there would not be changes in the borders between the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the Bosniak-Muslim republic. These two republics would be able to establish special relations with Croatia.

Aid Flights to Sarajevo To Resume 11 Jan

AU1001210894 Paris AFP in English 2057 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Geneva, Jan 10 (AFP)—Relief flights into Sarajevo, suspended last week after an attack on the city's airport, are to resume Tuesday, UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] spokesman Ron Redmond said Monday.

Redmond said UN officials had received new assurances from Bosnian Serbs and the Moslem-led Bosnian Government about the safety of aid flights, suspended after a rocket landed on the runway on January 5. The countries participating in the operation—Germany, Canada, the United States, France, Britain and Norway—had agreed to the resumption of flights, he added.

Redmond said 21 flights into the Bosnian capital were planned for Tuesday. The first aircraft of the day would be a Canadian plane flying out of Ancona in Italy.

An attempt was made on Sunday to resume the aid operation, but stopped after four flights because of the security situation around the capital.

Reaction to Brussels Summit Reported

Defense Minister Cited

AU1001210694 Sofia Bulgarska Televiziya Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Interview with Bulgarian Minister of Defense Valentin Aleksandrov by Sevda Shishmanova on 10 January; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Our reporter Sevda Shishmanova asked Bulgaria's Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov about his views on the latest initiative of the NATO leaders at their summit in Brussels.

[Aleksandrov] The Partnership for Peace lays the foundation for the European armed forces' integration.

[Shishmanova] Yes, but it does not provide any guarantees for our defense.

[Aleksandrov] Look here, guarantees can be provided (?only by the state institutions). There are no other guarantees. Who is going to attack us? Greece, Turkey, or Romania? You must realize yourself that this is preposterous. This cannot happen.

[Shishmanova] Nevertheless, there is a war, in Yugoslavia.

[Aleksandrov] The Army can cope with this. You should understand that guarantees of the kind that the Soviet Union used to provide can no longer be obtained. There is no one to provide them.

[Shishmanova] Perhaps NATO.

[Aleksandrova] Whom should it provide guarantees for?

[Shishmanova] Evidently, not for us.

[Aleksandrova] Yes, evidently not for us, (?hence we should adopt other models).

[Shishmanova] In that case, what is the Partnership for Peace doing for us?

[Aleksandrov] It is a serious [words indistinct] for our defense. [several words indistinct] The so-called Visegard Four member-states are not pleased, because they will not join NATO before us.

[Shishmanova] Yes, but Clinton is expected to meet their leaders, rather than ours.

[Aleksandrov] This is Clinton's business, it is none of my concern. I am neither president, nor prime minister, I am minister of defense. However, I must tell you frankly my point of view, which I have repeatedly stated, namely that none of those countries is ahead of us, and I should point out that we see considerable opportunities in the NATO program that we intend to take full advantage of.

Zhelev Comments on Membership

AU0701155294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] The traditional New Year reception given by President Dr. Zhelev for the diplomatic corps took place at the Boyana Residence today.

In greeting the diplomats, Dr. Zhelev expressed his confidence that, as in the past, also in 1994, their benevolence and good intentions toward Bulgaria are likely to contribute to our country's efforts for international support. Bulgarian democracy has reached the middle of its first seven years and is still expected to accomplish a great deal, but the path of changes that Bulgaria embarked upon four years ago is irreversible, the president assured his audience.

Mr. Zhelev recalled the essence of Bulgaria's international policy and its Balkan policy in particular, which is aimed at building lasting good neighborly and mutually advantageous relations.

Dwelling on the forthcoming summit meeting of the NATO member-states scheduled for 10 January 1994, the Bulgarian head of state pointed out our country's stand of principle, according to which it is striving to join NATO after the North Atlantic bloc has, possibly, decided to expand.

Relegation to 'Third Echelon' Alleged

AU1101120094 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 8-9 Jan 94 p 6

[Commentary by Georgi Apostolov: "Bulgaria Relegated to Third Echelon"]

[Text] The meeting of the Visegrad Four in Warsaw produced an unexpected but not surprising result—the Four became a "Three Plus One."

The Czech Republic decided to act alone on its admission to NATO after it realized that Moscow would hardly lift its veto over the admission of its close neighbors, such as Poland, to the North Atlantic Organization. It is very possible that Hungary would follow the Czech example. On the other hand, Slovakia, just like Poland, is not one of the favorites, because of its weaker economic development.

Against the background of those developments the Czech Republic and Hungary form the first echelon of the candidates, Slovakia and Poland the second, while the other East European countries, outside the Visegrad four, will naturally remain in the third position. The irony of this development is that the new U.S. diplomatic vocabulary appeared to be completely opposite to the reality. Justifying its retreat from the previously expressed readiness to expand NATO toward the East, Washington adopted the "avoiding a new division in Europe" expression. Under this euphemism one understands an unwillingness to admit to NATO the East

European states that are close to Russia in order to not isolate Moscow. However, in practice this attitude led toward two new divisions. In addition to the old division into East and Central Europe, now there is a "first central group"—the Czech Republic and Hungary, and a "second central group"—Slovakia and Poland.

For the time being Bulgaria is in the third echelon. However, while the Bulgarian politicians continue to place their bets on the group principle, which has already failed, possible new divisions are possible, which will push Bulgaria even more toward the back of the line.

Deputy Defense Ministers, Ambassador Appointed

AU1101144094 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Personnel Changes in Defense Ministry"]

[Text] By a presidential decree Mr. Mikhail Atanasov Srebrev has been released from the post of deputy minister of defense on military-political issues, because of his appointment as Bulgarian ambassador to Austria. Boyko Nikolov Noev has been appointed to the post of deputy defense minister on military-political issues. Vladimir Trifonov Penchev has been appointed deputy defense minister on financial and foreign currency issues.

Defense Ministry Denies Conflict With Zhelev

AU0701200294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] The Ministry of Defense declares that the letter addressed by President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev's [of 22 November 1993] to the minister of defense, which is not secret, settles the functional duties of the president's military cabinet as well as the mutual relations between the aforementioned cabinet and the relevant departments of the Ministry of Defense.

The announcement of the Defense Ministry further stresses that no differences on the military policy of the Republic of Bulgaria and on the leadership of the Armed Forces exist between the president and the Defense Ministry's commanding staff.

Politicians Blamed for Economic 'Chaos'

AU0701133894 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Jan 94 p 6

[Commentary by Ivan G. Ivanov: "Hasten Cleverly, but Not Slowly"]

[Text] The Ministry of Industry has made a request to dismantle and sell 200 enterprises that have accumulated 10.89 percent of the total uncollectable debts in the industrial sector. The tripartite commission is insisting on closing down firms that have leased out more than half their property in the present financial impasse.

For years on end, our politicians and rulers have watched with mixed feelings while the state economy sinks into a sea of problems. They hastened slowly, and did absolutely nothing. Finally, unemployment has gone through the ceiling, reaching 21.4 percent, not including those on unpaid leave. In the state industry alone, bad debts have reached monstrous dimensions—almost 13 percent of the GDP of 501 billion leva that the government is budgeting for this year.

Only now have they got busy, because a market economy cannot be made without a market, and the simplest definition of a "market" is a place where someone sells something and someone else buys it. In Bulgaria this second "someone" is looking around a great deal, but buying little. His cash funds are mainly dependent on the state sector. However, because no one is buying anything, everyone is making losses without exception.

The general flurry of activity is giving rise to chaos. At the end of 1993, parliament failed to realize how many laws were needed before the bad debt problem can be settled. Now at last, they are proposing extremely painful and now unavoidable "surgical" measures that will be very difficult to implement. The country lacks coordination, a legislative base, and budget funds.

Cannot the authorities and the politicians hasten intelligently?

Prague Citizens Look Forward to Clinton Visit

LD1001174094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Public opinion polls are geared to the coming visit of U.S. President Bill Clinton. Ilona Dientsbierove has more details.

[Dienstbierova] The DEMA joint-stock company has prepared a series of questions concerning President Clinton's visit, targeted at 300 respondents from all Prague districts.

Some 63 percent of Prague citizens are looking forward to this visit, and 60 percent view it as an appreciation of current developments in our country. Approximately 50 percent of the respondents consider the visit by the U.S. President to be an expression of appreciation for President Vaclav Havel. Approximately the same percentage of the respondents consider this event to be an important step that should lead to the strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Czech Republic and the United States. It is interesting to note that approximately half of the respondents were unable to answer the questions.

The DEMA company was also interested in President Clinton's popularity among Prague citizens. According to the survey, the pattern of his popularity is relatively the same in all age groups. However, women are looking forward to his visit to a greater extent than men, by 67 percent to 59 percent.

Klaus: Need for 'Real' Cooperation in U.S. Plan

LD1001205294 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Madelaine Albright and John Shalikashvili started their talks in Prague by meeting Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. The content of the talks was aimed at assessing the U.S. project Partnership for Peace. According to the prime minister, the project is valued by the Czech Government for the broad and liberal approach it offers its participants. U.S. interest in the development of regional cooperation, which, according to Madelaine Albright, is as important as the Czech Republic's good relations with the United States, was also debated.

[Begin Klaus recording] I think the American side understands that if we protest sometimes it is rather a protest against certain empty regionalism, against artificial concepts that lead nowhere. As for real and good regional relations, we, I believe, say clearly yes. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Klaus on Visegrad, NATO, Russian Threat

AU1001192794 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 8 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Roman Krasnicky in Prague; date not given: "The Free Trade Zone Is a Test of Cooperation"]

[Text] [Krasnicky] Czech-U.S. talks will be held next week. What do you want to say to Bill Clinton?

[Klaus] The security issue will be a dominant feature of these talks. Nevertheless, the Czech side would like to point out the inseparability of security and other issues and to emphasize the connections between security policy and general economic and social policy. We would also like to discuss how the Czech Republic views its future and cooperation with the United States.

[Krasnicky] People in Hungary and Poland are reproaching you for preferring bilateral talks with U.S. officials at the Prague meeting and not a joint course of action by the Visegrad Four states....

[Klaus] These opinions reflect certain disappointment that the Americans chose Prague as the place to hold their meetings with these four countries.

I would not look for anything more profound in this. As far as cooperation among these four countries is concerned, we have said thousands of times that we favor cooperation in all spheres where it is suitable. We are placing extraordinary emphasis on the greatest test of cooperation. This test is not summits and meetings between presidents and prime ministers but the free trade zone. Here the Czech Republic is in the lead, while some other countries that would be glad to have highest-level summits are, compared with us, applying the brakes in intensifying the free trade zone. At the same time, this cooperation is in our most vital interest.

[Krasnicky] Our neighbors are interested in joining NATO. Their motive is obvious. Are you also concerned about Russian neoimperialism?

[Klaus] First, I would like to say that it was Czechoslovakia that told a somewhat surprised Poland and Hungary that we want to join NATO. This is a historically proven fact, and nothing in our conceptual decision has changed, except that in the Czech Republic today we are making less pointed statements. Second, we respect Partnership for Peace as an intermediary step, and our task is to make maximum use of this concept for partnership. The U.S. plan envisages the conclusion of individual treaties between NATO and the individual countries. These treaties will not be formulated unequivocally and will be able to differentiate more between the individual participants. There will be sufficient scope here for the Czech Republic to use this institute if, of course, it is adopted by NATO on 11 January.

[Krasnicky] What about the Russian threat?

[Klaus] Let us in no way underestimate it. However, I would not separate this threat from the whole issue. The Russian threat is not a military one. It is the threat of mastering—or of not mastering—the early postcommunist phase. This threat has social, economic, political, and, only at a certain point, military dimensions. At the same time, I concede that the Czech Republic is a little further toward the West than, for instance, Poland. This issue is more sensitive for the Poles than it is for the Austrians, for example. In this issue, I would place us more alongside Austria than Poland.

Klaus Responds to Walesa's Claims on Visegrad

LD1001200894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has made a statement on the claim by Polish President Lech Walesa in today's LIDOVE NOVINY to the effect that the Czech side superimposes its interests above the joint aims of the countries of the Visegrad Group. Klaus says that the Czech side is neither an organizer nor an initiator of the Prague talks between President Clinton and political representatives of the four countries of Central Europe. The Czech side is merely happy to accept the U.S. initiative and welcomes the fact that these important talks will take place in Prague.

At the same time, Vaclav Klaus sees no reason for the failure of these talks. As he went on to say, the offer for him to deliver the joint viewpoint of the four countries mentioned by President Walesa was not made to Vaclav Klaus, and that is why he could not reject it.

I would be a very bad Czech politician, the prime minister continues, if I did not put Czech interests above the joint aims of the countries of the Visegrad Group. President Walesa is right about that. But I believe that he does not do that sort of thing. [as heard] The joint interests of the Visegrad Group countries are the highest common denominator of the interests of the individual countries, nothing more and nothing less. We would only make a mistake if we incorrectly interpreted our own long-term interests, Vaclav Klaus stresses in his viewpoint on Lech Walesa's LIDOVE NOVINY allegations.

President Vaclav Havel will not make any statement on the interview granted by Polish President Lech Walesa to LIDOVE NOVINY.

Deputy Foreign Minister on NATO Membership

AU1001144294 Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 6 Jan 94 p 10

[Interview with Pavel Bratinka, deputy foreign minister of the Czech Republic, by Juergen Gottschlich and Tomas Niederberghaus; place and date not given: "The Shadows of Munich"]

[Excerpts] [DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Mr. Bratinka, why is the Czech Republic so interested in becoming a member of NATO?

[Bratinka] NATO is a tested organization that has protected Western Europe against Soviet aggression for 40 years. It is an association of democratic countries that act on consensus. Even though today it is said that there is no threat in Europe at the moment, NATO is able to guarantee its members' security, regardless of where danger comes from. Think of the Gulf war.

No matter how things might look to you from the West, our region is anything but stable. People do not feel safe. The only organization that can provide security is NATO. However, we need NATO for still another reason: It keeps the United States in Europe. The past century has made it quite clear that Europe is a very dangerous place without the Americans. [passage omitted]

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Is Russia a hostile country for you?

[Bratinka] Not at the moment. Our enemies are the nationalists, who attack each other and destabilize the region.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] But this is precisely what NATO cannot prevent.

[Bratinka] No, that is not true. As an organization, NATO would be able to intervene in the former Yugoslavia, but it is not ready to act. However, this is a discussion about what it should do and not what it would be able to do. Without the structure and experience of NATO, European security is inconceivable.

Our current problem is the general insecurity and the extremists from the various camps. Think of Zhirinovskiy in Russia. [passage omitted]

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Why does the Czech Republic now try to pursue NATO membership on its own and no longer as a project of the Visegrad states?

[Bratinka] Well, because NATO will never accept countries that do not fulfill certain criteria. This will work only bit by bit. But this is not so bad. When a former communist country in Eastern Europe—I hope it will be my country—becomes a NATO member, this will have considerable effect on the entire region. Why? The West would then have crossed the Rubicon, would have moved from the sphere of beautiful words and vague promises to concrete deeds.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] And you believe that NATO will take the step across the Rubicon?

[Bratinka] We do not assume that we will get a membership certificate at the coming summit. However, we expect to see a light at the end of the tunnel, and this would be an encouraging development also for the other countries in the region. We envisage this development in

two stages. First, a general decision. If this is positive, there will be a concrete process of different duration for the different East European countries. There, each country has to present itself; there the issue will be finances, armaments, and other problems, joint training, etc. We assume that NATO will recognize our accession as a gain for everyone. We do not want to be a stowaway in NATO, for whom others pay.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Is it conceivable for you that NATO will change to such an extent that Russia, too, is able to become a member of the club?

[Bratinka] Of course, NATO must take care to remain capable of action. Countries that want to be members should examine themselves as to whether they are willing to adjust to the rules of NATO and whether they are able to do so. If this is so, they should become members. No one will seriously claim today that Russia corresponds to these criteria. Let us wait and see. As soon as the Russians have concluded their reforms and stable institutions have developed, this question might make sense.

The West had better support the beginnings of democratic institutions in Russia now. Zhirinovskiy had $1 million available for his election campaign, far more than the democratic parties. Where are the billions and billions of dollars that the West has given to the Russian Government? The West should give grants to Russians so that they can accumulate experiences with the democratic system, so that as many people as possible learn in practice how parliamentary democracy actually works. [passage omitted]

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] What would be an alternative to NATO? Why do the East European states not form their own alliance, which would then cooperate with NATO?

[Bratinka] NATO has the experience and the infrastructure, and, if every country makes its army compatible to NATO, the countries can automatically cooperate with each other. Therefore, joining NATO is the realistic path. Also for political reasons—think of the conflicts between Slovakia and Hungary—such an association, an alliance of East European states, would hardly be possible. In West Europe it worked only because the United States exerted a lot or pressure and the Soviet threat was so massive. No, this is no realistic path.

A message by NATO that says "we do not want you, solve your problems on your own" would be a disaster for the region. Above all, the reform states would slide into a big crisis. The democratic movements have all come to power with the slogan: Now we will again become a part of Europe, a part of the Western world. If the reformers are now betrayed, the hour of the nationalists will come—as it happened before in history.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] You speak of betrayal. Do we understand you correctly? You mean that if you now have to remain outside the door, this would be a repetition of Munich in 1938?

[Bratinka] Yes, exactly. For us it can be compared with the Munich Agreement and with the Treaty of Yalta. There are so many political desperados who are just waiting to sow unrest, to play up the Sudeten German issue, and to accuse the West of alleged mistakes in history. A rejection by the West would be like a shadow of Munich.

[DIE TAGESZEITUNG] Would you consider membership in NATO more important than membership in the European Union?

[Bratinka] These are two different problems, which cannot be discussed as alternatives. So far, no one has told us that we have to choose between membership in NATO or in the European Union. If this were the case, we would certainly have a heated debate with quite contrary preferences. So far, however, we have not been confronted with such a dilemma.

Differing Views on Partnership Plan Noted

LD1001194494 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Regional cooperation between states, as well as our demonstrated unwillingness to join this cooperation with regard to security issues, was another much debated topic during the trip by Madelaine Albright and John Shalikashvili in the four states of Central and East Europe. Jiri Payne, chairman of the foreign committee of the Chamber of Deputies, told our correspondent Miroslav Repka the following:

[Begin recording] In your opinion, should the Czech Republic take an independent course of action in joining the Partnership for Peace project or should it be done jointly, within the Visegrad Group?

[Payne] The initiative itself is formulated in such a way that every state is to take an independent course of action. Every state has to decide for itself on the speed with which it wants to progress in the cooperation. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Announcer] Jiri Dienstbier, former foreign minister and present chairman of the Free Democrats, voiced a somewhat different opinion on the participation of individual states of the Visegrad Group in the Partnership for Peace.

[begin Dienstbier recording] Of course, I believe that each of these Central European countries has to create its own internal conditions for joining the structures of the developed world, including NATO. However, I also strongly believe that, if these four countries take a joint course of action, they will, either jointly or individually, achieve this much sooner. If the four countries keep quarreling and outdoing each other while trying to prove who is better and who is worse, there is no guarantee of a desired achievement. [end recording]

Estimated Revenues From Privatization Reported

LD1001225194 Prague Stanica Praha Radio Network in Czech 2130 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Excerpt] A news conference about privatization took place in Prague today. Jitka Kucerova has more details.

[Kucerova] According to Roman Ceska, first deputy minister for the administration and privatization of the national property, 90 percent of the property earmarked for privatization has already undergone the approval procedure at the ministry and has been handed over to the National Property Fund. Revenues from both small- and large-scale privatization are estimated at 54 billion korunas [Kc] so far. Mr. Ceska also said the small scale privatization was completed at the end of 1993. Any property remaining will be privatized by large-scale privatization methods. [passage omitted]

Unemployment Totaled 3.34 Percent in Nov

LD1101094494 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0600 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] At the end of November 1993, the Czech Republic state budget showed a surplus of 2.7 billion Czech korunas. This transpires from the data of the Czech Statistical Office released yesterday [10 January]. The number of unemployed has increased to 175,800, while the number of job vacancies has dropped to approximately 55,000. Thus, the number of unemployed was three times higher in November than the number of job vacancies. Two-thirds of the unemployed are workers. The unemployment rate was 3.34 percent.

Kovac, Meciar To Lead Prague Delegation

LD1001202994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] The Slovak delegation at the Prague meeting of representatives of Visegrad Group countries with U.S. President Bill Clinton will be composed of President Michal Kovac, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Moravcik. It will probably also include deputy prime ministers Jozef Prokes, Sergej Kozlik, and Julius Toth, and Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky. Our delegation will leave for Prague tomorrow afternoon.

Michal Kovac will also hold talks on Wednesday with Czech President Vaclav Havel and Hungarian President Arpad Goncz. He will also meet his Polish counterpart, Lech Walesa.

Bilateral talks of prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic and, naturally, bilateral talks of our representatives with the U.S. delegation are also expected.

Kovac Favors Cooperation of Visegrad Countries

LD1001214994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] President Michal Kovac is prepared to receive information about the Brussels NATO meeting, which is to be given by President Clinton to the top officials of the Visegrad Four states during their meeting in Prague.

Answering a question from TASR [Slovak news agency] concerning his opinion on the cooperation of Visegrad Four countries in their effort to join NATO, Michal Kovac said he personally believes coordination and cooperation will help the countries involved get incorporated into this security structure, although Partnership for Peace is a project to be concluded with the alliance by each individual country separately.

Kovac Discusses Minority Policy With Hungarians

LD0701204194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] In Bratislava this afternoon, Slovak President Michal Kovac received for the first time personally representatives of the Hungarian Civic Party [HCP]. Anton Bodis, the president's spokesman, will now tell us about the preliminary results of that meeting. He is at this moment on the other end of the telephone line. Good evening. Can one already talk about some specific conclusions from that meeting?

[Bodis] Good evening. HCP Chairman Laszlo Nagy briefed the president about the proposals, which his party sees as being possible ways of improving the position of national minorities in Slovakia. The final conclusions will be known as soon as the president has studied these proposals in greater detail. The HCP chairman also briefed the president about the party's attitude to tomorrow's meeting in Komarno. The president voiced the hope that the meeting will take place in a calm and nonconfrontational tone.

Michal Kovac appreciated the realistic and tolerant attitude adopted by the HCP to relations between Slovaks and the Hungarian national minority, and toward ways of improving them. Both sides agreed on the need to outline the national policy of the Slovak Republic and ways of implementing it.

Council Urges Hungarians To Reassess Actions

LD0701232494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] The Bratislava City Council today discussed the appeal issued by the Association of Towns and Villages of Zitny Ostrov, as well as the question of to what extent it concerns self-administration of the capital city of the Slovak Republic. In the statement given today to the Press Agency of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava Mayor Peter Kresanek believes, along with members of the City Council, that sound reason, responsibility, and the interests of all citizens of the Slovak Republic will prevail.

The City Council appeals to mayors of the Association of Towns and Villages of Zitny ostrov with a feeling of regret and misgiving that, instead of taking a common approach in pushing through self-administrative structures and interests of the citizens-voters, they have chosen a path of unrealistic demands that do not represent a real interest of the inhabitants of the towns and villages of that region.

In the statement, Mayor Kresanek and members of the Bratislava City Council, addressing their colleagues from the Association of Towns and Villages of Zitny ostrov, call for well-considered conduct and a fundamental reassessment of the course they have taken up to now, which otherwise might lead to raising nationalistic passions.

More on Komarno Meeting of Hungarian Minority

Statement Issued

LD0801212294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 8 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Members of local government bodies, mayors, and deputies of legislative bodies from southern Slovak met in the sports hall in Komarno this afternoon. [passage omitted] Also present at the meeting was our Radiozurnal, represented by Jarmila Tosecka and Peter Rohac. Despite difficult conditions, they have prepared a comprehensive report. [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] During the debate, the organizers acquainted the participants in the meeting with the open letter addressed to the president of the Slovak Republic and the citizens of Slovakia:

[Begin unidentified voice recording] We are sorry that solutions that concern a further intensification and application of the principle of self-administration, civic freedoms, and human rights in the case of minorities provoke hatred, intolerance, and political arrogance. The state belongs to each citizen; no more to some than to others just because they speak a different language. Let us seek a path to each other, but on the basis of equality. We will find stability only when a community will not want to interfere, on the basis of vindicated privileges, in a restrictive way, in the rights of another group. We are convinced that democracy is indivisible. It is either for everyone, or it will cease to be democracy. As citizens of the Slovak Republic, we hope that you will understand our sincere endeavor to achieve more democracy for all citizens of Slovakia because only from them any sovereignty arises. [end recording]

[Tosecka] All those present approved by acclamation the final statement issued by the participants in the Komarno meeting. It is divided into three parts. [passage omitted] The first part contains a statement on the territorial administrative reorganization of Slovakia, and I quote: The participants in the meeting state that the present system of public administration in the Slovak Republic does not tally either with European requirements or the demands of the local population. Since 1990, the government has been planning a reorganization of the public administration system. The participants declare first that the government proposal does not suit the majority of the local government bodies in Slovakia and is unacceptable to the Hungarian community because the area in which the Hungarian community lives will, according to that proposal, be divided into five territorial administrative units that would promote organized assimilation.

Second, in setting up administrative areas and organs of state administration, it is necessary to proceed from the principle that will ensure that the law prevails, and from a two-tier system of public administration. In our view, there exists two possibilities of reaching a solution—that is, to form one continuous territorial administrative unit, a region, stretching from the territory south of Bratislava up to Kosice, broken by a corridor, and then continuing to include Juzny Zemplin and the area between Uh and Latorica; furthermore, to create three territorial administrative units, regions, stretching from Bratislava to Sahy, from Sahy to Kosice, and then Juzny Zemplin and the area between Uh and Latorica. The Hungarian language island south of Nitra should form an individual area that would consist of 18 villages with almost 13,000 inhabitants of Hungarian nationality.

Furthermore, the opportunity should be embodied in the law of bilingual dealings both in verbal and written form with official matters at offices, within the framework of territorial administrative units of the first and second tier, endowed with particular powers.

Further, from the viewpoint of authorities and powers, the system of institutions within the framework of territorial administrative units should be compatible throughout the territory of Slovakia, with the exception of the territories inhabited by Hungarians or members of other national minorities. These territories should have a special legal status.

Second, there is the statement on the jurisdiction of local government bodies. The participants in the meeting state that, in the Slovak Republic, the rights of local government bodies are inadequate. The development of local government bodies meets with obstacles. Their rights are deliberately restricted. Central power is getting more powerful, to the detriment of local government bodies, and the superiority of state administrative bodies is asserted against them. For this reason, the Slovak Republic should sign, as soon as possible, an association agreement with the European Charter of Local Government Bodies, and it should embody the rights of local government bodies in the Constitution and the law. Furthermore, the vast majority of public matters should be tackled at a local level.

I can quote, furthermore, the right of local governing bodies to form associations and their right to join international associations. In the interest of legal certainty, the Constitution should define for taxation purposes the system of local government bodies, their authority, and their powers. Before the implementation of the new system of the territorial administrative division of the country, within the sense of Section Two of Article 64 of the Slovak Constitution, it is necessary to create, on the basis of a voluntary association of local government bodies, larger territorial units that would come under the jurisdiction of future territorial self-governing bodies, while paying regard to the recommendation of the Council of Europe No. 1201. In the interest of the decentralization of power, the rationalization of state administration, and the strengthening of public accountability by transferring powers from the state administration organs to local government bodies, it is necessary to bring administration closer to citizens and to broaden constitutional powers of local government bodies, in particular in the field of education, culture, health, public security, and environmental protection.

Third, there is the statement on the constitutional status of Hungarians. The participants in the meeting state that the Hungarian population in Slovakia, despite a number of repressive acts and oppression during the totalitarian regime after World War II and other attempts to bring about ethnical homogenization of the population, has preserved its capacity to express itself again as a political entity, organize its community, and preserve the original population structure on the lands where it has been living for the past thousand years and, in the majority of cases, where it forms a majority of the local population. [passage omitted] ...as a national community, it fights

with resolve to ensure that, apart from individual rights to which everyone has the right, community rights are also acknowledged to it and that its status as a community is embodied in the Constitution. [passage omitted]

Right To Use Language Sought

LD0801222194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 8 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Over 2,000 people, many more than planned, took part in the Komarno mass rally of Zitny Ostrov. [passage omitted] Evelyn Forro has sent a report from the scene:

[Begin recording] [Forro] [passage omitted] The Hungarian nationality community in Slovakia considers it indispensable to its development that its members be able to use their mother tongue where 10 percent of the population is Hungarian, and Hungarian should be an official language, together with Slovak, where they are in the majority. [passage omitted]

At the news conference following the rally, Komarno Mayor Istvan Pasztor said they are patient. They wish to hold discussions. If these do not succeed, they will wait for the next parliament.

At the session, the Hungarian nationality representative of the Party of the Democratic Left proposed a supplement to the stance—namely, that the participants should declare that no danger whatsoever threatens Slovak autonomy, sovereignty, and the borders. This proposal was not taken into consideration. In answer to my question at the news conference, the mayor said the reason they did not vote on it was that, in their view, these points, in a different formulation, have figured in the stance.

The participants of the Komarno meeting have asked the Council of Europe to mediate between the Slovak Government and the Hungarian minority. [end recording]

1993 Budget Ends in 22-Billion-Koruna Deficit

LD1001220494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] According to preliminary data, the Slovak state budget for 1993 ended in a 22 billion koruna deficit. Julius Toth, deputy prime minister and finance minister, said at a meeting of the government's economic council that the Cabinet had to tackle some problems and release some finances at the end of the year. Expenses in health service and education had risen considerably, and this resulted in an increase of the overall budget deficit.

With regard to the unfavourable result of 1993 payments with the Czech Republic, Julius Toth said that Slovakia's negative balance was caused by pre-Christmas imports from the Czech Republic.

Gazprom Company To Supply More Russian Gas

LD1001220094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Sergej Kozlik received Rem Ivanovich Vyasirev, president of the Russian company Gazprom, in Bratislava today. Mr. Vyasirev briefed the deputy prime minister on the deliveries of Russian gas for Slovakia. The two officials agreed to increase shipments of natural gas to Slovakia to 5.5 billion cubic meters this year. They have also assessed the possibilities of a long-term contract for the year 2005, which should represent the delivery of 10-11 billion cubic meters of natural gas for Slovakia.

Jeszensky Sees Partnership as 'Road to NATO'

LD1101115894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The subject of the usual weekly press briefing by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry was the summit of the Visegrad Group of countries. Geza Jeszenszky's ideas, which he outlined before leaving [for the Prague meeting], have been summed up by Jozsef Barath.

[Barath] The series of meetings in Prague and the negotiations of leaders of the Visegrad states with President Clinton and with each other will strengthen the cooperation of the Visegrad Group members—cooperation which derives from the shared fate of the Central European countries. This was said by [Foreign Minister] Geza Jeszenszky at his news briefing, which is still in progress.

In the foreign minister's view, the Partnership for Peace is one of the important stages on the road to NATO. The current NATO summit is similar in significance to the decisions in Copenhagen last summer on the long-term possibility of joining the European Union. Geza Jeszenszky emphasized that the current summit dispelled anxieties about the possibility that NATO's function might cease. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has fulfilled the security vacuum which has developed in our region, he said.

The foreign minister welcomed President Clinton's confirmation that the United States has important interests linked to Central Europe. The 16 NATO states pledged their support for NATO's expansion.

Horn Outlines Stance Toward Neighbors, NATO

AU0901145594 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 6 Jan 94 p 21

[Interview with Gyula Horn, Hungarian Socialist Party chairman and former foreign minister, by Jan Zizka in Bratislava; date not given: "We Want To Reach an Historic Settlement With Our Neighbors"]

[Text] [Zizka] Improving relations with neighboring countries is one of the key issues in your party's foreign policy concept. Does this mean you are dissatisfied with the policy adopted by the present Hungarian Government toward your neighbors?

[Horn] Close relations with Western integrative groupings is, of course, a priority of our foreign policy concept. Considerable progress has already been made here. We have been a member of the Council of Europe for more than two years and we have observer status in the Western European Union. On the other hand, there are a number of problems in the economic sphere. Many of the Western companies that enter our market, unfortunately, suspend production in a number of branches instead of concentrating on restructuring outdated capacities. We receive second- or third-rate technology from the West. In some cases, this technology represents a risk to the environment. On the other hand, the opportunities we have for gaining access to Western markets are somewhat limited. This, however, makes no difference to our priorities. Improving relations with its neighbors is another key issue for Hungary and its security. Our main objective is to achieve a historic settlement. We have to agree that the issue of the borders and the historic peace treaties is closed for us. Nevertheless, we desire—or request—that the rights of the Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries be respected. There can only be a real improvement in relations if these two aspects are combined. Apart from this, we should not allow economic cooperation to be limited hereafter to neighboring countries, although, following the collapse of CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] and the Warsaw Pact, this is—to a certain extent—a natural phenomenon.

[Zizka] Do you also regard the Czech Republic as a neighbor?

[Horn] Yes, it is an indirect neighbor; there are significant traditions here from the era of the former Czechoslovakia. In view of the difficulties in cooperation with the West, we should pay more attention to the economic integration of Central Europe. The first step should be the establishment of joint banks, joint enterprises, and the expansion of mutual trade. Whether the specific form of expanding trade is considered modern or not is not so important. If possible, it is necessary to implement a form of barter. It is important to find a market for our products. If our party assumes responsibility for the government after the next elections, it will definitely pursue a very active policy toward our neighbors.

[Zizka] Nevertheless, if you are talking about improving relations with your neighbors, then—obviously—you are not happy with current government policy.

[Horn] Two sides bear responsibility for the current situation—not only Hungary. Understandably, some of our representatives should avoid making speeches that offend our neighbors. However, the representatives of neighboring states should also somewhat alter their stance toward us. As a representative of one of the left-wing parties in Hungary, I would like to point out that the Socialist International has incorporated into its program a item on guaranteeing collective rights for minorities. Guaranteeing linguistic and cultural autonomy and self-administration still does not automatically mean separatism.

[Zizka] What, then, is the difference between your party and the government in the minority issue?

[Horn] In principle, there are no major differences here. I think our policy would be imprinted with greater activity. It is essential to approach mutual talks more actively and to initiate specific proposals for improving relations. That would probably be the main difference.

[Zizka] What is your party's view regarding the initiative by local organs in south Slovakia to establish an autonomous Hungarian region?

[Horn] It is necessary to specify exactly what comes under the demand for autonomy. In my opinion, this would mean that they could really make decisions on the issues that concern them. The majority of people in this region are Hungarians. It is logical, therefore, that they are demanding something that is already standard in Europe.

[Zizka] You said you regard the Czech Republic as an indirect neighbor. Not long ago, however, you proposed that a regional group be established comprising Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Austria—but not the Czech Republic.

[Horn] For some time I have been of the opinion that the Czech Republic is not very interested in the Visegrad Group. This was perhaps due to the fact that your representatives wanted to distance themselves a little from our region. I understand this; there are many conflicts here and perhaps it is better for the Czech Republic not to be here. Maybe Czech representatives feel that, if they do not enter into the initial stages of integration with us, they will be able to integrate themselves more quickly into West Europe. Your Prime Minister Klaus has made a number of statements in this regard. On the other hand, however, we bear in mind the fact that you signed the free trade zone agreement in Krakow.

[Zizka] The opinion prevails in Prague that the original aims of the Visegrad Group have already been fulfilled. President Havel has also said this.

[Horn] In my opinion, it is impossible to describe any aim as fulfilled. Economic cooperation has just begun and we still have far to go before this aim is fulfilled. It is necessary to maintain and further develop the Visegrad Group's activity. It would be desirable to include other countries—Slovenia and Croatia, especially if the war there comes to an end. The participation of Austria is very important. The issue involves cooperation throughout the entire Central European region.

[Zizka] You proposed recently that the Hungarian parliament begin discussing the issue of entry into NATO. At the same time, however, you emphasize that this must be decided in a referendum.

[Horn] I suggested this because many people doubt that joining NATO would be beneficial to our country and even consider it to be a bad move. It is not true that there would be a nationwide consensus on this issue. I was intent on making sure that parliament considers this issue. It does not only depend on the people understanding what NATO membership will mean. It is such a serious matter that it is impossible for any government to request admission without the prior agreement of parliament. As far as a definitive, official request for admission is concerned, in my opinion, it has to be preceded by a referendum.

[Zizka] What is your party's view on possible entry?

[Horn] I, for example, am definitely in favor. As foreign minister, I made a statement at the beginning of 1990 in which I called for closer relations with NATO, relations that would result in membership. This met with great opposition from many people. In the end, the right wing also added its support to entry. I think many people do not realize what NATO membership actually means. It is necessary to clarify this in parliamentary discussions and to consider the commitments and rights arising from it.

[Zizka] The Americans have come up with the "Partnership for Peace" security initiative. What do you think of it?

[Horn] I have reservations about it. This proposal is in fact a temporary solution. It is intended to show us the workings of NATO, how we could restructure our armed forces, and the kind of commitments arising for us from mutual cooperation. I am not explicitly opposed to it, but I have no illusions in this context. It is—sui generis—a manifestation of the fact that the NATO countries also do not know what to do with Central and Eastern Europe. On the one hand, they are aware of the great pressure from our countries and of the request for security guarantees. On the other hand, they are hesitating; they do not want to provoke Moscow. They will be even more cautious following the recent events in Russia. It will be a long time before we have real security guarantees in our region.

[Zizka] You said that you do not rule out the possibility that your party will enter into government after the elections. Are you anticipating this?

[Horn] Everything depends on the election results. This is the key issue for us. If we achieve a result entitling us to participate in the government, we will assume the responsibility. It will also depend on whether we reach an agreement on the main policy issues with a potential coalition partner.

[Zizka] Are there potential coalition partners?

[Horn] Of course. Those who are now in the opposition—the Union of Free Democrats and the Union of Young Democrats, FIDESZ. Smaller opposition parties, for example, the Republican Party, the Agrarian Union, and so on are also being taken into consideration. That is, those who give priority to pragmatism and resolving specific problems over ideology.

[Zizka] However, FIDESZ representatives are not displaying much willingness about entering into a coalition with you.

[Horn] They have not issued any such statement. They have merely said that they do not want to form a preelection coalition with us. This is understandable; we also do not want this. A government coalition is something else, however. It is a matter for the future.

Editorial Criticizes Klaus Over Visegrad

AU1101123594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Jan 94 p 3

[Editorial by Endre Aczel: "The Czechs' Separate Way"]

[Text] If the "Visegrad Group" has no common position for President Clinton in Prague—and it will not have one because of a lack of coordination—this will in effect mean that the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia have different ideas about the framework of their cooperation with NATO and about occupying this framework.

It is justifiable to say that this is not a decisive viewpoint because, after all, it makes no difference what the applying parties want from the club if its statutes and rules have been laid down without them and will not be changed for their sake.

However, it is an essential viewpoint that the "Visegrad" countries do not wish to take a common stand or act as a "group exercising pressure" on behalf of their own future and, let us admit, this does not strengthen their position. Even if the assertion of the will originating from this side would be extremely limited anyway.

The lack of such a will is basically to be found in the attitude of the Czech Republic, or more exactly in the attitude of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. I would like to remind readers that the independent Czech Republic was exactly five days old when, in an interview given to LE FIGARO, Klaus expressed his lack of interest in the "Visegrad" cooperation, and made it clear that, by becoming independent, the Czech Republic did not only "get rid" of the Slovaks, but also of Poland and Hungary. Consequently, the Czech Republic does not want to share the common label that might characterize the "Visegrad" Group in one way or another either at the NATO level or the EC level. In Klaus's view, such a label would harm the Czech Republic.

It would harm them, because Klaus regards his own republic as being in a much better condition than Poland or Hungary; as for Slovakia, he does not even consider it worth mentioning. I would not comment on this view but, from the viewpoint of NATO membership, I would point out the advantageous situation obviously enjoyed by the Czech Republic. A glance at the map is sufficient to show that, of the "Visegrad" countries, only the Czech Republic has no direct borders with the former Soviet Union; consequently, Moscow, which continues to think in "empire" terms, can have much less of a quarantine feeling in connection with the affiliation of the Czech Republic than with the possible NATO membership of Hungary, Poland, or Slovakia.

In other words, if Moscow's sensitivity is the basic reason for NATO's reluctance to accept the "Visegrad" Group, then the Czech Republic, which is in a geopolitically favorable position, is the least to blame for causing this sensitivity.

However, one can easily predict that, after the NATO summit and for the time being, the "Visegrad" countries will fall under the "uniform label" so much criticized by Klaus; it is unimaginable that the NATO would offer more to the Czechs than to us, for example. However, this will definitely not hinder Vaclav Klaus in continuing his tough struggle for the priority of the Czech Republic, and it is to be feared that, just like the Poles, Hungarian diplomacy will seek "sponsors" for the same thing. For quite some time, Brzezinski called Poland "candidate number one" and we should also consider the strong Polish lobby in the United States.

To unsuspicious eyes, the "summit" in Prague could give the impression that "Visegrad"—an existing formation—is actually not something alive and its members are not bound by a solidarity of the type of "either together or not at all." And the selfish and arrogant Klaus is to be blamed for all this.

Walesa To Attend Visegrad Group Summit in Prague

LD1001143094 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1423 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 10 Jan—President Lech Walesa will take part in the Wednesday [12 January] summit of the Visegrad Group in Prague, Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski said after the Monday meeting of the government. According to Olechowski, the president never had any doubt whether he should go to Prague.

Paper Views Clinton Speech, Walesa Stand

WS1001143094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 Jan 94 pp 1, 23

[Article by Krystyna Grzybowska from Brussels: "Against a New Division of Europe"; final three paragraphs attributed to M.W.]

[Text] On Sunday [9 January] in Brussels, U.S. President Clinton warned former communist countries against the possible return of dictatorships and presented them with the prospect of joining NATO. However, he ruled out the possibility of broadening the organization immediately. "We cannot replace old divisions with new ones," said Clinton.

The speech by the President of the United States was the most important event on the day before the opening session of the North Atlantic Council. It was delivered at a meeting with young people in Brussels City Hall.

In his 30-minute speech, the President emphasized: Europe is the main partner of the United States, but it is not the only one. The United States is also linked by partnership to the Americas and Asia.

Discussing the security of Europe, the President stated that it must be constructed on the rules of democracy, free market, and civil society. Military security depends on all of these factors as well. The President said that Europeans are part of the Western European Union, the European Union, the CSCE, and the United Nations. However, NATO is the foundation of security.

"Partnership for Peace," understood as a process or an evolution, is aimed at broadening NATO and opening the door for cooperation for all former adversaries, including Russia and Ukraine. The U.S. President did not exclude the possibility of NATO intervention if peace were jeopardized in Europe.

The Final Communique Commission has almost finished working on the text of this document. As we could find out in Brussels, the most important part of it concerns NATO relations with the states of Central and East Europe. It is supposed to be declared that these relations will be broadened, deepened, and strengthened. As a sign of the final overcoming of former confrontation, joint maneuvers of NATO and former Warsaw Pact states are to be held as early as this year. They are supposed to be a preparatory step before peace missions.

The project defines "Partnership for Peace" as a transitional form that would link the Central and East European states to NATO and that would not threaten Russian reforms. Thanks to broad military cooperation, these relations are to be raised from the level of dialogue to the level of political and military partnership. NATO will want to adjust the Central and East European armies to the standard of the alliance through practical cooperation and officers' training. Thus, an important condition would be met before integration with NATO at a later date.

The first step is supposed to be joint maneuvers. Moreover, Central and East European states will be allowed to send liaison officers to NATO Headquarters.

In the general document, which should be signed by NATO and its partners soon, East European states are supposed to commit themselves to respecting the following rules: non-secrecy in national defense and budget planning; democratic control over the Armed Forces; allowing the United Nations and CSCE to employ their military units in peace missions; developing military cooperation to plan and carry out these missions, as well as transforming the Armed Forces so that they will be able to act jointly with NATO forces at the operational level. NATO is supposed to supply these states with the necessary technical information. Soon both parties are to select units that will cooperate closely with each other.

The final document will also include a detailed list of the measures that are necessary to harmonize activities, including the standardization of arms and equipment, as well as necessary for logistics, strategy, and the martial doctrine.

The only thing that was not made clear before the summit is the matter of financing the future cooperation. The mere establishment of additional offices and work posts will cost at least several million ECU.

Aside from that, the NATO summit is to decide whether quick-reaction multinational forces should be established for possible use in peace missions. They would be able to include military units of states that are not NATO members and of states that are not part of the military structures of the alliance, that is to say, France and Spain.

"Combined Joint Task Forces" [CJTF] [preceding four words in English, translated into Polish as] ("Combined Forces")—consisting of all kinds of weapons, may be employed in all crises not envisioned in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. It is expected that CJTF will also consist of units of neutral states as well as from Central and East European states. If these forces were established, in crises NATO would not have to act as a whole; it would place only some of its military installations at the disposal of the Europeans.

[Box, p 23]

In their reports from Central Europe, world news agencies draw attention to the fact that President Lech Walesa threatened to reject the concept of "Partnership for Peace," if NATO does not state unequivocally at the summit in Brussels that the "Partnership for Peace" program is the road leading to Poland's full membership in NATO.

Agencies report that Lech Walesa is said to have stated that unless the NATO summit produces a decision on opening this organization to states such as ours, he will not go to Prague on 12 January to take part in the meeting between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Visegrad Group leaders. The President's Press Office did not confirm this information on Sunday when asked by RZECZPOSPOLITA. The decision whether Lech Walesa will go to Prague is supposed to be reached on Monday, after the session of the government and the president. In his interview with French television on Sunday, Walesa maintained his criticism of the "Partnership," calling this proposal "blackmail."

Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak said that the initiative of the U.S. President is "unclear," known only by its name. His talks with representatives of the U.S. Administration did not result in any declarations that the "Partnership for Peace" program will lead to membership in NATO.

Walesa: Joining NATO Depends on Security

LD1101124094 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1100 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by correspondent Grzegorz Miecugow; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] According to President Lech Walesa, if the political situation in Central and Eastern Europe becomes more complicated, our joining NATO may happen sooner. Tomorrow, [12 January] President Walesa is going to Prague, where he will take part in the Visegrad group summit.

[Miecugow] Tomorrow you will meet President Clinton. What do you want to tell the president?

[Walesa] Of course, what I have already said but in a different way. [Before], I spoke to the nation but not in a diplomatic language. I was counting on social pressure. One talks slightly differently to diplomats, but we talk about the same things. That is, in my opinion, I think that the leap should have been greater, that one should have moved further. I think that this has been a mistake. However, as I have said, one can reach the same aim at a different pace.

Nevertheless, these talks will be difficult because I expect that this concept [Partnership for Peace], which in a way has been imposed on us, will be defended.

[Miecugow] Do you still believe that Poland is one of the Central European states first in line to join NATO?

[Walesa] As a practitioner, I think that these priorities are relative. If the situation becomes difficult and dangerous, Poland will certainly be the first. If the situation is different, if great compromises happen, if there is some sort of pulling out [jakies takie wydzieranie], the others and the more minor will have a greater chance to be withdrawn, or incorporated [in NATO]. This is a game involving interests and how large the country is. Poland, however, is a medium size country. Other countries, and especially Russia, focus particular attention on us.

Walesa, Oleksy Discuss Partnership for Peace

LD1001195094 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1900 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] President Lech Walesa received Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy in the Belweder this evening. Pointing out that in several hours' time he will meet U.S. President Bill Clinton in Prague, with whom he will discuss, among other things, the results of the NATO Brussels summit, the president said: We should have one position on this issue—where Poland is and where it is going.

After the meeting, which lasted almost an hour, Speaker Oleksy told journalists that the Partnership for Peace initiative is not regarded by him or the president as sufficient, although it is a step in the right direction, and a step which makes it possible for Poland to continue to aspire to NATO membership. The speaker said that he will discuss the decisions taken by the Brussels summit with German politicians during his visit to the Federal Republic as early as Wednesday.

Olechowski Cautiously Welcomes Peace Partnership

LD1001142494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1326 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 10 Jan—An insufficient step in the right direction. This is how Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski summed up the discussion on Partnership for Peace at Monday's government meeting, which preceded the Prague summit of the Visegrad Group.

Olechowski said that the Council of Ministers "welcomed the Partnership for Peace as an interesting initiative that goes in the right direction" and authorized the prime minister to support this program.

The government assessed the decisions that are expected from the Brussels NATO summit (reassurance concerning the U.S. presence in Europe, the opening of NATO to new members in an evolutionary process, Partnership for Peace, and a definition of new relations between NATO and the Western European Union) as favorable from the point of view of Poland's interests, but it has reservations because they are not specific enough.

President Lech Walesa, who took part in the meeting, left the Office of the Council of Ministers without making any comment to the press.

Olechowski Comments Further

LD1001170994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1453 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Warsaw, 10 Jan—An insufficient step in the right direction—this is how, according to Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski, the government assessed on Monday [10 January] the U.S. proposal on Partnership for Peace. [passage omitted]

President Lech Walesa, who took part in the government meeting, left the Office of the Council of Ministers without making any comment to the press. Olechowski said that the president will take part in the Prague summit. According to the foreign minister, the president—like the government—considers the Partnership for Peace proposal as insufficient, which does not mean that he is against it. "If when jumping across a hole in the ice your jump proves too short you have every chance of falling in," Olechowski quoted Walesa as saying.

One of the Polish reservations about Partnership for Peace concerns the lack of a time-frame for granting NATO membership. "We perceive it as a process lasting several years," Olechowski said. He recalled that even a few months ago there was no mention of NATO opening up to new members and added that at present the "partnership" makes our future participation in the structures of the treaty plausible. In his opinion the postponement in time of Poland's membership will not bring about immediate negative effects because currently there is no military threat. Olechowski said that he does not regard our present position concerning NATO as a waiting-room situation but rather as "being engaged to a girl who only yesterday said that she was going to get married but did not say to whom." He expressed the hope that Poland will be in the first group of countries which NATO will incorporate in the future.

According to Olechowski, as far as democratic standards and the development of the military sector are concerned, Poland is no more lagging behind than was Greece when that country joined the treaty. He said that issues related to the funding necessary to implement the "partnership" program were also discussed at the meeting. He emphasized that the pace of bringing Poland closer to NATO will depend on our financial contribution.

Asked whether he envisages a meeting with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, if his visit to Poland takes place, Olechowski said that his diary is full. "If I were to meet every member of parliament, I would not be able to do my job," he said, adding that Zhirinovskiy may enter Poland, but if he breaches our interests, he will be taken back to the border with an administrative visa

Security Chief on NATO Admission Issue

WS1101123094 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0715 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Interview with Jerzy Milewski, chief of National Security Bureau and deputy defense minister, by Andrzej Woyciechowski at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Text] [Woyciechowski] How should we, Poles, feel after yesterday's NATO summit?

[Milewski] We should feel that our duty is well performed because the recent political campaign headed by Foreign Minister Olechowski and Lech Walesa made the American-devised "Partnership for Peace" proposal, approved by the summit, more far-reaching than was expected several months ago.

[Woyciechowski] In other words, we have won at least something. Does this not mean that the previous governments could do more than they actually did?

[Milewski] No, they couldn't do anything more. Now we can see what caused our major problems and where the main resistance was. The 16 states that make up the bloc should be convinced that the expansion will be beneficial for them in the first place, and not just for somebody in Central Europe. In addition to government leaders, this also applies to governments, legislatures, and societies of those countries.

[Woyciechowski] So where was the highest resistance?

[Milewski] I think all 16 members lacked a full understanding as to why NATO should be expanded at all. However, the main opposition was mounted by the southern countries because they receive NATO aid in the form of weapons. They know that with new members entering the bloc, the assistance provided to them will be substantially slashed. Another source of resistance came from political circles in the United States that have basically Russia in the focus of their attention and are preoccupied with a dialog with Moscow politicians. The most understanding was exhibited by our neighbors—Germany, Denmark, and Norway.

[Woyciechowski] What you are saying about the southern states receiving substantial assistance is very interesting. You probably have in mind Spain, Portugal, and Greece.

[Milewski] Yes. On the other hand, Turkey, which is located in the eastern direction, absolutely supports us. Obviously, with Russia within a stone's throw, it knows very well what it means to be on the edge.

[Woyciechowski] As a matter of fact, we don't know what this "Partnership for Peace" is all about. Could you tell us exactly what it means?

[Milewski] The "Partnership for Peace" is a program intended to make possible cooperation and rapprochement of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council members with NATO countries in military, political, and other spheres, such as environmental protection and economic matters.

[Woyciechowski] If I understand correctly, the Partnership is a very broad formula that will be implemented only after subsequent conclusions of bilateral agreements on military and political cooperation. Is that correct?

[Milewski] To the best of our knowledge...

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] And we don't know all the details yet, right?

[Milewski] Yes...

[Woyciechowski] When will we know all the details?

[Milewski] Probably tomorrow.

[Woyciechowski] In Prague.

[Milewski] Yes, in Prague or in Warsaw when we know the full contents of the document approved by the NATO summit yesterday. This is a complex program providing for many types of cooperation among countries seeking integration with NATO. And the scope of this cooperation is to be determined by the target countries and not by the plan's authors. It's a strange proposal, but this is what it looks like.

[Woyciechowski] Does this mean that those bilateral agreements on military and political cooperation will be different depending on which country signs them?

[Milewski] The framework cooperation agreement should be the same. Western leaders declare that there will be no differentiation among post-communist countries, including Russia, and neutral states—Austria, Finland, and Sweden. On the other hand, specific implementation of those agreements may be different for each state. Some of them, for example, might choose between looser or closer military cooperation with NATO countries.

[Woyciechowski] What kind of cooperation will Poland propose?

[Milewski] I believe we would opt for the broadest possible cooperation as long as our budget will sustain it.

[Woyciechowski] One of the Partnership's provisions speaks about cooperation in drafting the defense budget. How will NATO cooperate with Poland whose military spendings account for 2.1 percent of the budget? Is it possible at all?

[Milewski] That provision is about technical assistance in crafting the budget in order to meet Western standards with regard to the so-called budget transparence. The budget transparence is regarded throughout the world as proof of the openness of the country it belongs to. This makes it impossible for a country to conceal preparations for a possible attack against its neighbors. This provision is not about financial assistance that NATO could offer us. We count more on technological openness and access to modern armaments available in the West. We also anticipate closer contacts among our servicemen starting from highest staff officers and finishing with rank and file soldiers.

[Woyciechowski] In other words, joint military exercises?

[Milewski] Both theoretical military exercises involving only maps and the teamwork of our detachments in the field.

[Woyciechowski] If everything goes well and Poland signs a military cooperation agreement, when do you think the first U.S.-Polish exercise could take place?

[Milewski] General Shalikashvili said that it may—and it should—happen already in 1994. Should these exercise take place on our territory and the Western troops cover the costs of their arrival and stationing here, the scope of our teamwork could be even broader. We can't move our troops there solely because of financial problems, which may become a major setback in developing such cooperation.

[Woyciechowski] When do you think Poland can become a full NATO member? In 2000, 2010..? When will we eventually get what we want?

[Milewski] I would not like to tell fortunes here. However, there are two things that I can tell you. First, the Polish strategic plan is to achieve NATO membership in the 1990's. Given the present situation in those countries, the waiting time could be from two to four years. Two years because that is the time left until the next summit of the bloc. Assuming that NATO countries accept our membership, the process of formal admission and approval by their governments and parliaments might take quite a long time yet.

[Woyciechowski] You, however, seem to be optimistic about the NATO issue?

[Milewski] Well, as far back as two years ago, it didn't seem the right thing to even mention our intention of joining the bloc as the West perceived the idea as being provocative toward Russia. The West has always been very anxious not to anger Russia. Since we are neighbors, we don't want to provoke Russia, either. We seek to establish good-neighborly relations with that country. On the other hand, we are absolutely convinced that Russia should not be provoked by saber-rattling and weakness as well. And leaving Poland and other Central and East European countries in the gray zone means exactly what we call provoking Russia with our weakness and exposing us as a potential target for Russia's expansionist policies, still popular among many Russian politicians.

[Woyciechowski] Is it essential to Polish interests that there still be some Russian troops on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic? Does this fact have any significance for us?

[Milewski] Russian troops in Germany as well as those heavily concentrated in the Kaliningrad zone are of great significance to us; we would like these troops to be deconcentrated. However, the most important thing for us is the policy pursued by Moscow, because we do not think that there is a threat of putting these units into action by their local commanders without authorization. The disintegration of Russian state structures has not reached that stage when such events may be expected.

[Woyciechowski] There are different rumors about the Russian concentration in Kaliningrad... What are those troops doing there?

[Milewski] For the time being, those troops are just stationing there since their withdrawal from Germany and Poland. We can only approve the fact that these troops are withdrawn and deployed on Russian territory. However, in the long run, we think it is absolutely improper and unnecessary for Russia to maintain such a big concentration of its military force...

[Woyciechowski] How heavy is this concentration?

[Milewski] Well, comparable to the military force of entire Poland. The Russian Navy concentrated in the port of Baltiysk near Kaliningrad is larger than the entire Polish Navy. The air forces are comparable, too. As for the ground forces, I guess they are smaller...

[Woyciechowski] ... on this small scrap of land?

[Milewski] Yes, on this small scrap. It is, perhaps, the strongest fortress in the world, not only in Europe.

[Woyciechowski] Is the Polish Defense Ministry preparing new offices for new coalition deputy ministers?

[Milewski] I do not know anything about it. I have not seen any special groups of painters busy at the ministry. The concept approved by President Walesa and Prime Minister Pawlak some time ago called for reducing the hired civilian personnel of the Defense Ministry. It also provided for the reduction of three deputy minister offices to two.

[Woyciechowski] Thus, there are two deputy ministers by now?

[Milewski] This is correct.

[Woyciechowski] Is there any need for more? Do you feel overworked?

[Milewski] In my opinion, we do not need more. Those changes in the organizational structure, which we hope to implement soon, can be controlled by two deputy ministers alone. It will do, especially now that the General Staff has its own head in the position of a deputy minister or even higher. De facto, the minister of national defense has three close aides, two of whom are civilians.

Geremek Says NATO Membership Not Urgent

WS0701163094 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0715 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Interview with Bronislaw Geremek, parliamentary caucus leader of the Democratic Union, by Andrzej Woyciechowski at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Text] [Woyciechowski] Radio Zet's guest today is Professor Bronislaw Geremek, a leader of the Democratic Union [UD]. Good morning to you.

[Geremek] Good morning.

[Woyciechowski] Why does NATO not want us?

[Geremek] First of all, we would have to ask why we want to be in NATO.

[Woyciechowski] So why do we want to be in NATO?

[Geremek] I think the answer is not very obvious at all. In essence, NATO is currently experiencing a crisis—it is a creature of the Cold War and it was supposed to be a countermeasure against the Soviet Union's imperialism, it was supposed to be Europe's and the West's defense. Now the Soviet Union is no longer here and the Cold War is over, and what will happen to NATO now? Well, it is simply the only European security organization which functions in practice and which has means at its disposal which enable it to respond to any kind of danger in Europe. I think NATO is currently going through a transformation. NATO must stop being a defensive, military-political organization and it must become an organization serving European stability; it is not yet ready to perform that role. After all, NATO is not prepared to try to overcome ethnic and border conflicts which are everyday occurrences in Europe currently. So it follows that NATO will transform itself. Poland needs to join a security organization so as to have a feeling of peace, and not because there should be a vacuum or because we should be orphans of the Warsaw Pact. I think Polish society has had historical experiences and historical perspective, and it remembers how alone Poland used to be. But society also has a feeling of a lack of social and economic security, at least in this one area—in the area of politics, society would like to have a feeling of peace and some minimum guarantees. That is precisely what NATO membership would mean to Poland.

[Woyciechowski] Was NATO not established to send their troops, tanks and aircraft in case—knock on wood that it never happens—somebody attacks Poland? Is that not what NATO is for?

[Geremek] There are two articles in the treaty—I mean the Washington Treaty which established NATO—there

is Article 5 which is the one we are after. It provides that in the advent one of the member states is attacked, all the other members make a decision—rather automatically—to defend the member which was attacked. There is also Article 4 which speaks about the NATO Council holding a meeting in specific cases to decide whether or not to intervene for the defense of a country which does not necessarily have to be a member.

[Woyciechowski] So NATO can intervene in such cases, but it does not have to?

[Geremek] Exactly. It has to under Article 5 though.

[Woyciechowski] But it can intervene also in cases of nonmembers being attacked?

[Geremek] Yes. The whole argument now is indeed about Article 5, since such a provision gives the citizens of a country a sense of security and at the same time it is a deterrent factor. But if one considers what the current political situation is about, I think the issue of our membership in NATO—I am expressing my personal view here, but in my opinion I have reasons to think that—is not so dramatically important at all. That is because it is inconceivable to imagine Poland being attacked by a country....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] And what about Yugoslavia? Could Croats or Bosnians have pictured somebody attacking them?

[Geremek, hesitating] I think what you are saying represents the type of thinking used by Americans, but it is false. Poland is in the center of Europe and Europe's fate is inextricably linked with Poland's fate. If an aggression occurred against Poland—who could make such an aggression? Let us say it is one of the neighbors....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Such an aggression would come either from the left or the right.

[Geremek] Historically speaking, they used to come from the left or the right—that is the way it happened to us throughout history. So in case an aggression like this occurs, all of Europe would immediately be involved. The French did not want to die for Gdansk in 1939 and then they died for their own cities—they lost the war. The necessary political imagination, so to speak, should make us realize that Poland is not in the Balkans and that one cannot make Poland marginal. There cannot be a situation where if there is a conflict occurring right here in Europe's center, NATO would regard it as a marginal conflict because NATO's border is on the Oder and Neisse rivers. That would be impossible. Moreover, if one were to assume that there could be politicians who would think that, then they would be acting to their own detriment. And it is not just a theoretical supposition that such politicians could exist—they do in fact exist. I have read an interview with a politician from the Western European Union who replied to precisely this kind of question by saying: Well, we will not intervene, but there is no such danger to begin with. Now....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] In a word, to recap all this—in your view, NATO's fear of accepting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is more linked to the destabilization in the Balkans, to those little, local wars, and to the fact that looking from Washington, one confuses Poland with Yugoslavia—and it is less linked to Poland's internal situation and also to the Zhirinovskiy factor?

[Geremek] The first part is precisely that—namely that one looks through the perspective of a completely separate conflict and thinks that one can make the issue marginal. A second part that you mentioned is the issue of the priority occupied by Russian issues. The West has very often in the past been bewitched by Russia and it gave Russia absolute priority. By the way, it is my view that we, Poles, should keep in mind that Russia continues to be a huge country and a superpower. It is afflicted with a disease but the disease is only temporary. But the thing is that American politics are now being guided by people who observe the Russian situation, and for whom the most important thing is to have some kind of agreement with the disordered East Europe. I think that even being familiar with the political geography of this part of Europe requires a certain effort, and it is a very easy thing to say to oneself: Here is a partner and now the thing is that the partner should—as the Clinton administration has the habit of saying now—be a partner in cooperation. I would say in that regard we can find traces of an old slogan which said that there must be order, and that the world will be peaceful if there is order in Warsaw. Well, that type of thinking is false and one will have to pay a price for that in the future precisely because Russia's main problem right now is the emergence of Zhirinovskiy. It is not a personnel problem or one associated with the person, but the problem is that imperial policy in which there are territorial claims and a desire to destabilize Europe and the world—the problem is that this kind of policy gained the support of one quarter of this huge country's electorate.

[Woyciechowski] Who is Zhirinovskiy? How should he be described? Is he a fascist? Is it fascism or is it something else?

[Geremek] It is dangerous. It is a danger and really—the plague, cholera, or typhoid fever seem minor by comparison, since it is a deadly [word indistinct].

[Woyciechowski] And how did it come about in Russia? How does someone like Zhirinovskiy emerge there?

[Geremek] I think that one should consider two phenomena here: The first one is that transformations and leaving communism behind are painful processes—and we know something about that, too—so there is impatience in society, frustration, and unhappiness with the reforms. There is also another factor—that is something which concerns the Russians' national pride. Russian dignity has been trampled on during these years, and that happened not only because their leaders banged their shoes against the seats at the United Nations—Russians

were ashamed of that. But what is worse is that all of a sudden Russia has no influence over anything, it is regarded as an object with which anybody is free to play.' The world's fate is not dependent on Russia even by a bit, but there is still an army there, there is a political class, and there is also a kind of popular feeling: We used to be a great country, and now what? Now, Zhirinovskiy was capable of telling everybody what they wanted to hear: He told laborers that they will earn more and that the workplaces will not be closed, he told peasants that some way or another will be found—either food production will be subsidized, or assistance will be given, if not to kolkhozs, then to private farms, and that his men know how to handle all this. And he told all Russians, including the military, KGB members, and everybody else, that Russia must be great, that it has a right to greatness, that it can have an imperial policy since it is in fact an empire and has such traditions dating back to before Stalin and the communist revolution. Now, he had the ability to use these sentiments for his own goals. One can say, if that is the case, to understand that the phenomenon means to immediately diminish its significance, as it were. I am very strongly opposed to many observers of the Russian scene—including some of my friends—who in my view tend to minimize the problem of Zhirinovskiy and they are very unwise in doing that. It is the problem of the future of democracy in Russia. If Russia is supposed to be a partner—which it can be—in world politics and as a democratic country, and one whose economy is improving—the phenomenon of Zhirinovskiy has a fundamental significance for both these issues.

[Woyciechowski] What is the difference between Zhirinovskiy and [Party X leader and former presidential candidate Stanyslaw] Tyminski? Why is the first one dangerous but the other one not?

[Geremek] Zhirinovskiy scored a success whereas Mr. Tyminski did not. I think an important difference is that Zhirinovskiy has within his clientele not only the capital of social frustrations but also huge structures. There is the problem of the Army. Others say there is also the problem of the KGB. But even if you consider the problem of the Army alone—I think it has between 2 and 2.5 million people, or more than that, in recent years all of a sudden it became a political factor and the Army is full of bitterness: A soldier who is told to storm the parliament building—no matter what cause he is supposed to be advancing—still has a lot of unanswered questions and besides, the soldier is being involved in politics. Well, now a type of politician has emerged whom soldiers and generals can trust, and they invest some of their hopes in him, so to speak, in the sense of saying to themselves that it is worthwhile to serve the country, make some changes and.... [pauses] Zhirinovskiy can say—and the demographics of his electorate is proof of that—that he gained the support of the Army. That is extremely important and that is the reason—among others—for which we cannot diminish Zhirinovskiy and his measures.

[Woyciechowski] Let us go back for a moment to the beginning of our conversation and the issue of NATO. Now, several minutes into the conversation, I will try to recap what I understood you to say: Joining NATO is not the most important thing for Poland since NATO is no longer what it used to be. It is NATO that must change, and then the time will come to deliberate what position Poland should take in this new European security system. Did I understand you correctly?

[Geremek] Well, I have been trying to go against the wind....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] In a word, is it very important or not very important, I mean this [words indistinct]. Is it really the most important thing?

[Geremek] It is really important but not the most important thing. I am going against the wind of the situation which was recently created among the public. I think it is a shame that it happened that the issue of joining NATO was used in political campaigns—it should not have been. It is a classic issue which diplomacy should have prepared and, once the possibility of joining NATO came up, then it could have become political fact. There are no possibilities right now of immediately joining NATO. If we were to join NATO right now, the state budget would not be able to carry the burden which modernizing the Army requires, as well as adaptation to NATO's standards. But there is a dangerous thing—and I openly admit that it bothers me not only as a politician but also as a citizen—that there could occur a refusal on NATO's part to allow Poland, the Czech or Slovak Republics, or Hungary to become NATO members.

[Woyciechowski] That simply affirms the fact that the iron curtain—even though in a symbolic way it no longer exists—remains at the Oder and Neisse, whereas we would like it to stand at least at the Bug river.

[Geremek] I do not even think that there is a postulate made on our part to move the iron curtain to the Bug river. What we want is for the curtain to disappear altogether. Right now....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] But in actual terms, the border is really Europe's border?

[Geremek] Yes, but it should be an open border. I think—and I often stress this and I have been saying this for a long time—that it is very important that Russians have a feeling of being free of any iron curtain which somebody could be erecting so as to separate them. Why is that? Even if one takes a skeptical view on chances in the face of Russian democracy, it is still important that the chances not disappear. Now, such a chance exists only when the West is open. The division in 19th century Russia between Slavophils and Zapadnikis [not further specified] existed because there was a chance. If we were now to close the door on Russia's chances of joining Europe and the West, we would weaken Russian democracy through that. That is why I think there is no closed border, so to speak. But there is a problem if NATO

refuses to allow Poland and other countries which are our neighbors—the question arises: For what reason? NATO countries are democratic countries and so is Poland, no matter how the political configuration may change. Should these countries be based on market economy? Poland has built a market economy, and Poland wants to be part of the peace process and of European stabilization. Why [words indistinct]...?

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] But I am sure you have asked that question of Western politicians. How do they respond?

[Geremek] They do not respond at all because they have a reasoning hidden here which we must not approve of and to which they have no right, namely: Here is the big country of Russia which should not be subjected to frustrations, and it is important that its right to a sphere of influence, so to speak, be recognized, and....

Is that kind of statement inelegant in politics? Should one avoid such statements in politics? Is it unacceptable?

[Geremek, laughing] Elegance I think is not very important in politics, but history is. When statements like this appeared in the past, Poland was losing its independence. And in the memory of....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] And not just in 1939?

[Geremek] Correct. That is precisely our national history. When we are told that two big countries will provide guarantees to us so we should not be concerned, our answer to that is: We have already seen that, and then there were the partitions of Poland. See, so national memory is an element of shaping politics. That is precisely why I think one should regard it [the Zhirinovskiy issue] as a serious and important issue. I think it is a very good thing that all of a sudden issues of foreign policy have become the focus of attention of the people—that is an achievement.

[Woyciechowski] For the first time in the last four years, most of the talk is not just about money or unemployment but also about foreign policy.

[Geremek] Yes, this is the first time. And that is a very important thing since there is a need for this kind of sensitivity to the country's defense system, the country's future, and to protecting Poland's sovereignty.

[Woyciechowski] But let us talk now for a while—to end this conversation—about money and the budget. Will UD vote in favor of the budget? I mean once the budget returns.

[Geremek] I will answer diplomatically since we are leaving diplomatic issues now: We will see what the second version of the budget will be like [words indistinct]....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] But do you hope the budget will be altered in the Sejm commissions?

[Geremek] I am somewhat afraid it will be—I think it will deteriorate. Budgets are instruments of conducting policy and we do not approve of the policy [by Pawlak's cabinet]. Voting is always about showing some trust. How can we trust a team which first of all did not keep commitments it made to its own voters? They promised everything to everybody.

[Woyciechowski] [Words indistinct] promised and you did not believe.

[Geremek] Yes, but now they are coming to me and it is I who is supposed to show trust. They disappointed the voters so they are bound to disappoint me as well. That is the first issue. Another one is that the budget demonstrates enormous centralization trends which are dangerous because one can say that after the forty-something years there is a natural, internal pressure, so to speak, within the entire functioning of the state apparatus, I mean a pressure in the direction of centralized distribution of money. And money is power. Unless you counteract that trend with a wise and tough policy, the trend will prevail. There is no such wise and tough decentralization policy—on the contrary, there is a spirit of taking power, and I mean taking power by officials in Warsaw. It is from Warsaw that voivodes [local government officials] are appointed—what the coalition wants to achieve is for Warsaw officials to have the money and then to give it to the appropriate people so they can be in power. Well, we cannot accept such a concept.

[Woyciechowski] Whose concept is it—[Prime Minister] Pawlak's or [Democratic Left Alliance leader] Kwasniewski's? Which one of them acts like that?

[Geremek] Well, if you allow me to, I would like to....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] You would like to avoid answering that?

[Geremek] No, I have a grievance against journalists that this is the way they approach issues like this. What I mean is that it is not a question of whether Pawlak is nicer than Kwasniewski or vice versa, but what kind of policy each of them conducts. It is precisely Chairman Kwasniewski—to my surprise, I was stunned—who said [words indistinct]: Replace voivodes, take power into your hands, we have to show we are in power in all the areas where we won. Well, that is a philosophy of power which is explained first and then implemented. On the issue of the budget, its composition and its implementation also—there are no differences. So the first issue is where Pawlak and Kwasniewski act together and in the same manner, and secondly there is the issue of possible differences—so far these differences are of minor importance.

[Woyciechowski] Thank you very much for the conversation. Radio Zet's guest today has been Professor Bronislaw Geremek. Thank you very much.

[Geremek] Thank you.

Article Sees Diplomatic 'Disaster' at Summit

AU1001151394 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Jan 94 p 6

[Article by Dawid Warszawski: "Winners of the Consolation Prize"]

[Text] NATO membership has become a key issue for us. But we know that not only do we have no prospect of joining NATO either today or in the foreseeable future, we have no reason to expect anyone to ever tell us when we can join NATO and under what terms. The decision due to be made at the NATO summit will be a disaster for Polish diplomacy. Could it have been avoided?

In a certain sense, no. Once Poland had formally announced its desire to join NATO, and especially once Russia had expressed its objection to this, it has not been possible to back down. The postcommunist coalition government could certainly not have withdraw Poland's bid to join, for the significance of such a volte-face would have been obvious. But should Poland have made such an effort to join?

What We Wanted

For Poland, NATO membership would have been a triple success. Symbolically, it would have satisfied our pro-Western ambitions and permitted an exceptionally favorable integration with the most important political and military structure of the West.

But most of all, it would have guaranteed us a degree of security that our country has never known. Our NATO bid was brought on by fears of a possible repetition of our recent negative past, and no one can say that these fears are not justified. It is enough to consider the danger of reemerging Russian expansionism. The conclusion was automatic—Poland simply had to apply for NATO membership.

Why Did They Not Want Us?

But it is Poland's thirst for security guarantees that made NATO reject our bid. Considering a possible expansion of NATO, its members asked themselves whether accepting Poland or any other former eastern bloc country to their ranks would increase their security.

The answer had to be no, on account of the genuine threat to Poland from Russia. Out of all the countries of Central Europe, only the Czechs were graded for membership differently, which would explain their ostentatious departure from Visegrad solidarity. In the event of a Russian attack on Poland, NATO would have to help Poland as a member country, otherwise the principle of collective security would cease to exist, and hence NATO itself would become defunct. Why should NATO risk accepting us?

Fear of Russia and Russia's Fears

Poland's response to this question is obvious. If Poland remains outside NATO, Russian extremists might be tempted to attack it, and it would certainly encourage instability in a strategically key part of Europe. NATO agrees with this view, but insists that such an eventuality is less of a risk than the issue of security guarantees to Poland. The British guarantees made to Poland in 1939 are quickly brought to mind in this regard. Western historians have denounced these guarantees as particularly irresponsible.

What is more, NATO views the Russian opposition to its expansion not as an impermissible case of Russian interference, which is what Warsaw thinks, but as as a justifiable expression of Russia's concern for its own security. Let is leave aside the problem of whether or not Poland's NATO entry would strengthen [Russian Liberal Democratic Party leader] Zhirinovskiy's position (as Strobe Talbott, the new pro-Russian U.S. secretary of state, claims it would), or whether, on the contrary, it would force the Russian extremists to think again (as our Foreign Ministry rather naively believes).

The point is that Russia is and will remain for a long time NATO's only potential adversary in Europe, and it cannot fail to react in a hostile manner to the prospect of moving the line of potential confrontation several hundred kilometers closer to its border. This strategic consideration is important. Because of it, Germany was the only NATO country to support our application to join, for in the event of our joining NATO, the line of confrontation would no longer correspond to the eastern German border.

NATO has no reason to antagonize Russia, especially at a time of imperial fever. But even a democratic Russia would have to oppose our membership of NATO. At the thought of an eastward shift of the NATO border, any Moscow government would react just like President Reagan reacted in the 1980's to the threat of an expansion of communism in Central America. NATO is prone to accept the Russian point of view.

Vain Hopes

So it is hard to understand why so much hope was attached in Warsaw to just one statement from President Yeltsin, whereby Russia had no objection to our efforts to join NATO. After all, it was clear that whatever Yeltsin might say, Russia's geopolitical interests would not change.

Poland's NATO membership would bring it a host of troubles but no tangible advantages. Why did we expect NATO to accept us? It was a mistake to make a formal application to join, especially when this application was justified by a threat to Poland—in other words, a threat to NATO. The fact that others made this mistake at the same time as us makes no difference. It is Poland, not, for instance Hungary, that is the basic object of the Central European contest of strength. Those who think

they might move the West by referring to noble principles and past services rendered should talk to the president of Bosnia.

Stakes Too High?

It is not out of the question that if we had not applied for full membership, we might have been able to negotiate quite a good unilateral deal that might not have contained any security guarantees, but it might have permitted political integration. In the meantime, the "Partnership for Peace" proposal is all that we are being invited to.

NATO is addressing these mainly rhetorical proposals of cooperation to all the countries of the former Soviet bloc, suggesting to them that NATO might eventually turn into something more concrete. As far as the "partnership" proposal is concerned, it means that NATO will care for the security of independent Poland as much as it will care for the independence of Kyrgyzstan. If I were from Kyrgyzstan, I might be pleased to hear it.

By hastily playing for high stakes, we have risked losing. Henceforth, we can only expect a part of the kitty—association with the Western European Union. Most probably, all that awaits us is the "Partnership for Peace" proposal—in other words, the community of consolation prize winners.

Kolodziejczyk on 'Partnership' as Stepping-Stone

BR1001151294 Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in French 10 Jan 94 p 14

[Interview with Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk by Christophe Urbanowicz; place and date not given: "We Want To Get Out of the Gray Area of Security"

[Text] *Poland is prepared to commit itself to a broad cooperative effort with the NATO member countries, including joint maneuvers, within the framework of the U.S. "Partnership for Peace" initiative, Polish Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk announced in an interview with LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS. He is waiting for the Atlantic Alliance to come up with precise membership criteria for countries like Poland instead of closing itself off in a "selfish and shortsighted strategy of every man for himself."*

[Urbanowicz] With the U.S. "Partnership for Peace" initiative, is the West sending you a signal of support strong enough to appease your fears and reaffirm your European aspirations?

[Kolodziejczyk] "Partnership for Peace" can only meet our expectations if it opens up clear prospects for countries like Poland of belonging to the Atlantic Alliance.

We understand that at present it is difficult for the West to put forward a precise date for our integration into the common security zone. However, we expect the NATO member countries to come up with clear criteria in the short term for NATO membership. These criteria could be compliance with the disarmament treaty, the UN Charter, the Charter of Human Rights and Citizen Rights, the obligation to have civilian control over the army, as well as transparency in military budgets.

[Urbanowicz] How far is Poland prepared to go in terms of military cooperation with the NATO member countries as part of "Partnership for Peace"?

[Kolodziejczyk] We are prepared to commit ourselves to a broad range of actions, including joint maneuvers. I recognize that this cooperation could cause certain financial problems for Poland, but the 1994 budget has not yet been passed by Parliament, and expenditure for the "Partnership" could be written into it.

We have already established broad contacts with many countries in the alliance. Poland remains open to other initiatives in the area of European security, such as the Danish proposal for military cooperation between the countries along the Baltic Sea.

[Urbanowicz] How did you receive the French-German proposal to offer Poland the status of "associate member" in the WEU (Western European Union), which is the embryo of the common security and defense policy of the European Union?

[Kolodziejczyk] France is a great advocate of the WEU. It is obvious that the process of integrating the countries of Central and East Europe into the European Union must go hand in hand with a rapprochement with the WEU, which plays the role of NATO's European pillar. Because I know that the United States takes a dim view of this initiative, I am still a bit skeptical about the WEU.

However, the fact remains that, for Poland, the most important thing is to get out of the gray area of security it has gotten into. I therefore feel that cooperation with the WEU can only benefit us.

[Urbanowicz] How much time will it take for Poland to reach the level of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance?

[Kolodziejczyk] For the moment, the West is mostly refusing to give us technological cooperation. Our own industry can produce limited quantities of good equipment, but not all of the parameters of this equipment match Western standards. Without technological openness by the NATO countries, these standards could prove to be inaccessible to Poland. I hope that the "Partnership" will make an initial breakthrough in this area, which is very important to us, especially now.

[Urbanowicz] What does Poland fear?

[Kolodziejczyk] For us, the areas of destabilization lie in eastern and southeastern Europe. The West does not seem to realize this, and it is therefore abandoning us. The West thinks that it no longer has anything to fear because the USSR has disappeared and because Russia is so wrapped up in its own problems. As for the countries

in East Europe, they will have to get by on their own. This selfish "every man for himself" policy demonstrates shortsightedness.

[Urbanowicz] Can the development of cooperation within the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) become the key to opening the European Union's door to its members?

[Kolodziejczyk] Not necessarily. It is above all a common platform from which the countries of Central Europe can speak with a single voice. The West is watching us do so with some caution and probably does not really think we can work effectively together within the four-member Visegrad Group. We want to prove otherwise.

Michnik Bemoans 'Wasted' Opportunity of Visegrad

AU0701200394 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Untitled commentary by Adam Michnik]

[Text] It seemed as if our countries had learned from the bitter experience of Munich, Yalta, and the Brezhnev Doctrine, which permitted the making of decisions about Poland's fate without Poland's participation. It seemed that Visegrad would change all this.

Visegrad was also a chance for stability in the center of Europe. It could have become a real partner for the powerful countries. It enjoyed excellent reviews.

But it did not last long. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia was the first blow to Visegrad. Then Slovak-Hungarian conflicts broke out. And then politicians, not just in the Czech Republic, decided that they would reach Europe sooner if they went alone.

It looks like the greatest political chance of the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians in the 20th century may be wasted.

ZChN Doubts Poles, Ukrainians To Reconcile

LD0901100294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1628 GMT 8 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 8 Jan—In the view of the Christian-National Union [ZChN], the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation that should be the aim of both nations must be preceded by the revelation and condemnation by the Ukrainian authorities of the atrocities perpetrated on the population of Volhynia by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA] [in 1943].

A statement issued by the ZChN Political Committee says that "the restoration of the property of the Ukrainian populace that in significant measure supported the ethnic cleansing and that was nationalized during 'Operation Wisla' may take place in the event there is a parallel restoration of the property of the Polish population expelled from Galicia and Volhynia during and after World War II."

The statement was issued in association with a letter from Ukrainian circles in Poland to the speaker of the Sejm in December of last year with a request for the abolition of the consequences of 'Operation Wisla', said Marian Pilka, member of the ZChN Political Committee, speaking to journalists.

The statement also asserts that the destruction of the Polish cultural heritage and the prevention of the restoration of Catholic church buildings to the Roman Catholic Church on territory at present belonging to Ukraine is directed against Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation.

Poll Shows Popularity of Prime Minister Pawlak

LD1001203594 Warsaw PAP in English 2005 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 10—Some 55 percent of respondents to a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Polling Centre (OBOP) reported that they were rather fond of Waldemar Pawlak. 46 percent liked Primate Jozef Glemp, while 45 percent were positively disposed towards Ombudsman Tadeusz Zielinski.

Other popular politicians are Jacek Kuron (39 percent of the poll respondents), Aleksander Kwasniewski (36 percent), Hanna Suchocka (35 percent), Andrzej Olechowski (31 percent), Jozef Oleksy (30 percent), Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz (28 percent) and Ryszard Bugaj (24 percent).

50 percent of the poll respondents were not sure what it is exactly that Michal Strak (head of the cabinet office), Marek Borowski (deputy prime and finance minister) and Aleksander Luczak (deputy prime and education minister) do.

48 percent dislike Centre Alliance (PC) leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, 39 percent—Lech Walesa, while 38 percent are rather ill disposed to Confederation for an Independent Poland leader (KPN)—Leszek Moczulski.

German, Israeli Flags Burned at Rally

LD0801152994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1400 GMT 8 Jan 94

[Text] Cracow, 8 January—At a rally in the Cracow Market Square on 8 January, members of the Polish National Party [PWN] and its leader Boleslaw Tejkowski burned German and Israeli flags to mark the 55th anniversary of the death of Roman Dmowski, the founder of the Polish nationalist movement.

As homage to Roman Dmowski, about 120 PWN supporters lit lamps and laid red and white carnations at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Jan Matejko Square. Under the slogans "Boleslaw Tejkowski for Polish president", "Nationalists not fascists", "Romanians go

home", and "Germans and Jews get out of Polish Silesia", the demonstrators marched along the streets of the city toward Market Square, where they burned the flags.

B. Tejkowski, the PWN chairman, told the rally and Cracow residents gathered in Market Square that Poland's attempts to join the European Union and President Walesa's intention to invite NATO armies to our garrisons constitute the greatest dangers for Poland at the moment.

The police, who did not issue an official permit to the PWN for the rally, did not intervene.

Officials React to 'Partnership for Peace'

Defense Minister Comments

AU1001175094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Interview with Romanian Defense Minister Niculae Spiroiu by unidentified Radio Romania reporter in Bucharest on 10 January—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Minister Niculae Spiroiu, the summit meeting of the NATO member countries is currently taking place in Brussels. What is your opinion about the solution proposed by the Partnership for Peace to the East European countries and about a possible access of our country to the North Atlantic Alliance?

[Spiroiu] Well, there have been long preparations for that meeting. As you know, there was also a meeting at Travemunde in October. This is a meeting whose importance is determined by the fact that, in practical terms, it will make official—so to say—a viewpoint of the Alliance about the future of the Alliance and mainly about the future position regarding the acceptance of Central and Eastern European countries in NATO. As is known, I have already mentioned it before that it is not the Romanian Army that joins NATO, but Romania, and this is Romania's foreign policy promoted by the competent bodies as stipulated by the Constitution. The Army and the Ministry of National Defense do nothing else but follow this foreign policy and thus prepare the necessary elements to enable our military body to integrate into the security structures that it will join, namely NATO, the Western European Union, as well as other structures. Thus, it is important for the Romanian Army that, by following Romania's foreign policy, it should make the necessary preparations for ensuring the compatibility of our military body with the military bodies of the countries that belong to the Alliance. Here I am referring to compatibility in the area of structures, the decisionmaking system, political control of civilian society over the military field, training programs, and ultimately also the equipment, an element that will be achieved gradually, as soon as necessary conditions will be created for it. In this respect one might say that the reform process in the Army that has been carefully prepared—preparations for this reform finalized at around the end of 1992 and its implementation started as early as 1993—and includes all these areas, starting with the legislative area up to the other areas that I have mentioned before, does nothing else but make our military body ready so that when the political decision for our country to join the NATO or the security structures, even on the basis of partnership is taken, we should be prepared for it.

All I can say is that the Army has taken steps in this direction. Certainly, the Partnership for Peace elevates to a new level the partnership that has existed so far within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], that was set up after 1991, that is, after November 1991. Why am I saying that it elevates the partnership to a new level? Because, this time we are no longer talking about a collective relation, that is, to join collectively these programs within the NACC, but about a bilateral option, namely, the option of each state to have access to this Partnership for Peace, certainly by fulfilling certain conditions. And all I can tell you is the fact that what we have been doing in the field of reforming the military body is perfectly valid also for the Partnership for Peace. Thus, if the meeting that is taking place today and tomorrow in Brussels and that is attended by heads of states and governments will adopt this idea of Partnership for Peace, I believe that Romania, and mainly the Romanian Army—since I can only talk on behalf of the Army—will fulfill the necessary conditions to enable the competent political bodies to take steps toward this partnership on a bilateral basis for peace.

[Reporter] Mr. Minister, do you believe that it is desirable to have one step or several steps in the process of joining NATO?

[Spiroiu] It would be a great mistake to have several steps. I have already stated, if I am not mistaken in the interview that I granted to the daily ROMANIA LIBERA, or even in the newspaper of the government that any type of discrimination would create distrust and suspicion again and would bring about a feeling of marginalization or isolation, which would be counterproductive in view of the establishment of security in this area. Thus, I believe—but I have to repeat that the decision rests with the political bodies—that every country should have equal security in this area, without discrimination, without new frontiers, a sphere of security in which one should take into account the interests of Russia and the independence of Ukraine. In general, I personally believe that these are very important elements for the establishment of European regional security, thus the zone that includes also Romania. Thus, this is very important.

Roman: 'Partnership' Disappointing

AU1101130694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] In connection with the NATO summit session held in Brussels, Mr. Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party, president of the Commission for Defense, Public Order, and National Security in the Chamber of Deputies, and special rapporteur of the NATO Assembly for the new European security order, made a statement to our radio network in which he mentioned that the proceedings have concluded without any surprise.

The U.S. plan of partnership for peace was adopted. For the countries that belonged to the former Warsaw Pact, among them Romania, this can be considered as a disappointing result. Romania can consider itself a country that deserves to have a more reassuring status for its own national security.

Mr. Roman also said that the plan for partnership for peace represents a compromise between the direct request of the former socialist countries to be accepted in NATO and Russia's insistent demand not to have such an expansion of that organization.

Opposition Requests Coalition, Early Elections

AU0701183094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] During today's news conference of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], CDR Chairman Emil Constantinescu presented the stance of that political alliance with respect to the evolution of the domestic political affairs over the past weeks, our correspondent, Iulia Gherman, reports.

After emphasizing the fact that, owing to the self-willed and rigid stance adopted by the ruling coalition, the political dialogue is currently blocked, Constantinescu pointed out that there are only two ways to overcome this situation, namely either the establishment of a new parliamentary majority or the holding of early elections. Talking about the first alternative, he asserted that the CDR will solely participate in the government together with the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] if the latter political grouping gets rid of the extremist parties and adopts a concrete anticrisis program. Related to the issue of holding early elections, Constantinescu said that this represents a constitutional and democratic method to solve the crisis caused by the lack of confidence in the current state power. If that solution will be really selected, that will be a direct consequence of the policy totally lacking imagination that is being promoted by the ruling party and its allies.

Constantinescu mentioned the fact that, tomorrow, the CDR Executive Council will meet in a conference to debate issues related to the current political, economic, and social situation in the country in view of the talks that are to be held on Tuesday [11 January] at Cotroceni Palace among President Ion Iliescu and CDR leaders.

Reform Council Chairman on Goals of PRC Visit

AU1001102094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 9 Jan 94

[Text] A government delegation headed by Mircea Cosea, state minister and chairman of the Council for Economic Coordination, Strategy, and Reform, will pay an official visit to China on 10-18 January upon the invitation of the Chinese Committee for Economic Restructuring.

Shortly before his departure, the head of the Romanian Government delegation made the following statement to our correspondents:

[Begin Cosea recording] We are leaving for a visit to the People's Republic of China. Our delegation consists principally of members of Romania's Council for Reform, but some delegates of the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry have also joined us. The visit is being made upon the invitation our council received from China's Committee for Economic Restructuring. We will have the honor of being received by China's prime minister and vice president. Practically every day, we will be able to meet with ministers and important personalities involved in China's reform.

For us, this visit represents a very interesting element, because as everyone knows, the Chinese experiment has been a success. We are not interested in duplicating the Chinese model; such a thing would be impossible, as the structure and grandeur of that country compels us to observe the proportions. However, the key elements of the way in which their new economic apparatus and market economy was conceived might be used by us as well. We could use certain elements that our Chinese friends resorted to in the southern part of their country, in building up a very large potential for exports there and in attracting foreign capital. Therefore, this visit may be regarded as a trip to accumulate experience and training in view of the Romanian reform.

I would also like to mention another important element of our visit, and that is the revival of the economic and political relations between China and Romania. This is to be a government visit, and the Chinese Government considers it as an event that could give impetus to the relations between Romania and China. China has become an economic world power and forecasts show that over the next 10 years, it will become one of the most important economic powers in the world. In my opinion, Romania should be very interested in not just profiting from that country's experience, but also in keeping close relations to that Asian area where such development is taking place and where we are interested and able to engage in exchanges and cooperation. [end recording]

Karadzic Protests NATO's 'Anti-Serb' Efforts

AU1001195494 Paris AFP in English 1928 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 10 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic on Monday [10 January] warned that a NATO threat to launch air strikes to lift the siege of Sarajevo could jeopardize the overall peace process for the region.

His comments came as North Atlantic Treaty Organization leaders, meeting at a summit in Brussels, discussed the possibility of renewing their threat of air strikes, originally made last year.

In a statement to the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency, he warned against an "anti-Serb resolution" by NATO, saying that air strikes would only create "new difficulties." In particular he said that if NATO agreed to any resolution "against the Serbs" they would be forced to review territorial offers to Bosnian Moslems—a key factor in the overall peace settlement.

"We offered 33.3 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Moslems, and accepted under certain conditions that Sarajevo be put under UN administration," he said. Karadzic said that, of the three warring sides, Bosnian Serbs had "proved to be the most cooperative."

He once again blamed the international community for the crisis in former Yugoslavia, saying it "would do nothing but continue its series of mistakes" if it continued to press its "anti-Serb" policies.

Karadzic Meets With UNPROFOR Officials

LD1001160894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1457 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 10 Jan (TANJUG)—President of the Srpska republic Radovan Karadzic received in Pale today the newly appointed head of UNPROFOR for the former Yugoslavia, the Japanese diplomat Yasushi Akashi.

Nikola Koljevic, the deputy president of the Srpska republic; Belgian General Francis Briquemont, UNPROFOR commander for the former Bosnia-Hercegovina; and Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN secretary general's special envoy, also took part in the talks.

After the talks, both sides expressed satisfaction and hope that today's constructive dialogue on humanitarian problems and the ways to resolve the Bosnian crisis would stimulate the peace process and speed up the efforts which are being made to ensure the respect of obligations which have been undertaken, particularly regarding the observations of cease-fires.

May Accept UN Protection of Sarajevo

AU1001153294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Report by Slobodan Kovacevic]

[Text] After his visits to Zagreb and Sarajevo, Yoshimo Akashi, special UN envoy and the newly appointed coordinator of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], accompanied by General Briquemont, is currently visiting Pale. Talks with the president and the vice president of the Srpska republic Radovan Karadzic and Nikola Koljevic, respectively, are under way. Slobodan Kovacevic reports:

[Kovacevic] The first meeting between the special envoy, Mr. Akashi, and the leaders of the Srpska republic was held, as we were told, in an atmosphere characterized by mutual understanding. All dilemmas and claims about Akashi allegedly not being able to arrive in Pale were clarified at the very beginning.

Mr. Akashi expressed concern about the current position of UNPROFOR in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the increasingly frequent attacks on the Blue Helmets. He also demanded greater guarantees from the Serbs for the transit of humanitarian convoys, as well as the free movement of civilians. He promised that UNPROFOR will do everything possible for Sarajevo airport to indeed be used for humanitarian purposes.

Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, told Akashi and Briquemont that the Serbian side could accept Sarajevo being placed under the UN protectorate under certain conditions, provided that a cease-fire, that is, imminent peace, be established immediately. Karadzic also expressed assurances that such meetings with top UNPROFOR representatives will be more frequent so that the Serbian side and UNPROFOR establish trust, especially regarding Sarajevo airport.

Karadzic briefly told journalists that Akashi and Briquemont confirmed that Sarajevo airport will in the future indeed be used only for humanitarian purposes and for the needs of the United Nations.

Let us also say that a regular session of the assembly of the Srpska republic is also being held here in Pale. The agenda includes numerous issues regarding the internal organization of the Srpska republic. A particularly important discussion, and perhaps the adoption of a special document on the continuation of the peace negotiations in Geneva, is expected late in the afternoon.

Karadzic: No Changes in Peace Proposal

AU1001212794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Interview with Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic of Srpska, by Slobodan Kovacevic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Kovacevic] Mr. President, you have briefed the deputies about the course of the peace talks to date. Is the Serbian side changing anything in the platform for the continuation of the talks in Geneva?

[Karadzic] For the time being we are not changing anything. We do not wish to add to any sort of confusion in hope that a peaceful solution will be found. We will leave it until the 18th [January], perhaps the 17th, or perhaps even after the 18th, in order to orient ourselves toward the future situation that will result from the Muslim-Croatian talks.

I would like to say that we have nothing against the Izetbegovic-Tudjman meeting in Bonn if this will contribute toward their reconciliation, which would help the overall peace in the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, if Germany tries to reconciliate the Muslims and the Croats and turn them against the Serbs, we will oppose this, naturally. For this reason we do not wish to contribute to any sort of disruption of the constructive atmosphere and will wait to see how the events develop.

Krajisnik Welcomes NATO Decisions

LD1101142394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1327 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Obrenovac, 11 Jan (TANJUG)—We welcome the decisions of the Atlantic alliance which, despite the Franco-British initiative to exert pressure on the Serbs, has given priority to the negotiating process, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the assembly of the republic of Srpska, told Radio Obrenovac today.

Although we continue to have a critical stance vis-a-vis some NATO moves, we do not conceal our satisfaction at the fact that the "Sixteen" in Brussels have advocated negotiations—something we have been in favor of from the very beginning, Krajisnik added.

He pointed out that the Serb side will continue to reject any planned resolutions that might imperil the strategic interests of the Serbian people.

Commenting on the possibility of the withdrawal of the "blue helmets" from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Krajisnik said that UN forces ought to remain until peace is achieved.

He added that the Serbs will not protest if the peacekeeping forces withdraw, because, he added, they have not been protecting the Serbs in any case, but the Muslims.

He recalled that it was with this protection that the Muslims had armed themselves. Peace could be achieved more easily and quickly, according to Krajisnik, if such support were withheld from the Muslims.

Serb Shelling of Sarajevo Continuing

AU1101100794

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 11 January carries in its regular 15-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the republic.

Reporting on the situation in Sarajevo this morning, the studio announcer says that "the general alarm has been sounded in the city. Just after 0900 the [Serb] enemy artillery shelled the city center. As we have learned from the state hospital, two lightly and two seriously wounded citizens have so far been brought in, while, according to incomplete information, a number of wounded have been brought into the Kosevo hospital. We again warn the citizens of the capital to observe all the self-protection measures envisaged by the general alarm."

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3d Corps describes the situation in central Bosnia yesterday, adding that "the fighting increased the number of killed members of the Vitez HVO so far which, according to the official information issued yesterday by the HVO operative area of central Bosnia, amounts to 1,504 killed fighters over the last six months."

In his report from Zavidovici, Viktor Boban says that yesterday was a "relatively quiet day, with sporadic fire from both aggressors [the Serbs and HVO]. A convoy of the aggressor's vehicles was spotted moving last night from the direction of (Globanica) to the fronts on the left bank of the Bosna River. This morning the enemy is occasionally firing with small arms in the Smajlbasici and (Brasljevine) areas."

Hamiz Deronjic reports from Brcko that "last night the [Serb] enemy fired with antiaircraft guns and machine guns along the entire front line. Earlier in the evening the aggressor shelled (Poderice) with 82-mm mortars, and some 10 82-mm mortars were also fired at Jagodnjak. The Lipovac defense lines were pounded all night with 120-mm mortars. The aggressor also reinforced his lines with men and equipment on this front last night."

Muslim Counterattack Kills 30

LD1001221494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Early this morning chetniks launched a heavy artillery attack on the Kalesija area. They also attempted two unsuccessful infantry attacks on the Memici-Brezik part of the front. The defenders launched a counterattack and destroyed seven chetnik trenches, killing more than 30 enemy soldiers. In revenge the chetniks shelled Kalesija and wounded four people. [passage omitted]

Humanitarian Airlift Resumes

AU1101095594 Paris AFP in English 0929 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Jan 11 (AFP)—The UNHCR humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo resumed on Tuesday morning

after a break of almost a week because of shelling around the Bosnian capital's airport.

The first plane to land, an American C-130, touched down at 0645 GMT, an official for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Kris Janowski, said.

He said 21 flights were expected during the day.

Usually between 25 and 27 planes daily bring in food, medicine and cold weather supplies, according to Captain Joel Fouquet, who is in charge of the 250 UN troops controlling the airport.

The UN Protection Force would like to up that to 40 a day, but "the Serbs are opposed to it," Fouquet told a press conference.

Nearly 90,000 tonnes of supplies have been unloaded from more than 8,000 flights into Sarajevo since the airlift started, he said.

Cluster Bombs, Chemicals Used in Vitez Attack

LD1101115194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Excerpt] After a relatively quiet night, the Muslim army began fresh artillery and infantry actions this morning. Ivica Saric reports for Croatian radio.

[Saric] In addition to the shelling of Vitez, the positions of the Croat Defense Council [HVO] in the Buhine Kuce region came under fire at 0900. Heavy machine guns are being used in the main. The enemy began infantry attacks in the direction of the Vitez operational zone at 0930 with the intention of restoring control over the buildings it lost yesterday in Buhine Kuce. Fierce street fighting and a battle for every house has resumed. The defense formations are successfully repelling the attacks by the Muslim army.

In the Vitez operational zone, they have evidence that in yesterday's shelling of Vitez the Muslim army used a type of cluster bomb. This refers to mortars which prior to exploding release dozens of the notorious bomblets which explode on impact. In addition to this, a number of shells which fell on Mali Mosunj in the municipality of Vitez were filled with chemicals. People felt sick and dizzy and there were visible traces of an inky color in those houses which were hit. [passage omitted]

Serbs Repel Muslim Attack Near Srbinje

LD1101100894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0908 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Bileca, 11 Jan (TANJUG)—The information service of the [Serb] Herzegovina Corps announced this morning that Serb fighters last night repelled a strong attack by the Muslim Army from the direction of Gorazde on the Nekopi area in the municipality of Srbinje (formerly Foca).

The same source says that, in addition to light weapons, the Muslims used antiaircraft guns and machine guns, as well as mortars.

The Herzegovina Corps headquarters claims that the "green berets" sent a sabotage-terrorist group into the Cajnice region yesterday, which was spotted and destroyed in time.

On other parts of the Herzegovina battlefield, only occasional provocations from light weapons were registered yesterday and last night.

Commentary Views Disputes With Slovenia

AU1101092594 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jan 94 pp 38, 39

[Commentary by Mihailo Nicota: "Two Singles on Turbulent Kupa River"]

[Text] Do you think that war might break out between Croatia and Slovenia? And if such a war were to break out, do you think we could win? Some two months ago the Ljubljana weekly MLADINA conducted a public opinion poll asking its readership these two questions. A large majority of Slovenes who took part in the poll, some 57.5 percent of them, do not think that a war between the two neighboring countries could break out, but as many as 31.8 percent fear that it might yet happen. However, while answering the second question a majority of respondents, though not an absolute majority, that is 48 percent, believed in Slovenia's victory, while only 13 percent believed the opposite!

Obviously, given the choice between realism and patriotism, the majority of Slovenes chose the latter, although it seems that in Slovenia, at least officially, just as in Croatia somewhat earlier, there now prevails the phase of a return to reality. To be more precise: In Slovenia one notices a strange discrepancy between the official policy of the coalition government, which is endeavoring to be objective, realistic, and moderate, and the Slovene media, which, with the assistance of some right-wing opposition politicians, are maintaining the high temperature with a sort of anti-Croatian campaign, full of exaggerations and fabrications.

Therefore one has to keep in mind that MLADINA conducted the poll with this campaign in full swing. Its climax seems to be the recently announced results of another public opinion poll, in which the Slovene respondents said for the first time that the Croats were their greatest enemies, and that a major disaster threatened them from the Croats, rather than—the Serbs! Such statements are very well supplemented by the threats delivered by Zmago Jelincic, the leader of a nationalist party, not only at rallies and through the media, but also in the Slovene parliament. Recently he even announced in Zagreb's GLOBUS a forthcoming war between the Croats and Slovenes. Of course, Zmago the celebrity (his name translated means "victor") throws no doubts whatsoever upon the Slovene victory in the war that will be started by the Croats, since, as Jelincic definitely knows, a group of experts in the Croatian Army is planning an attack on Slovenia! It is true that the nationalist madness sometimes knows no limits, but it is also certain that the insane campaign carried out by some Slovene media, as well as the performances of some politicians, do not reflect the real disposition of public opinion, and particularly the official policy on Croatia. Nevertheless, the fact is: Croato-Slovene relations have been through many turbulent phases of rises and falls.

In short, in two and half years, first in the period up to 25 July 1991, when both Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves sovereign and independent states, after which they recognized each other as such, and then after that historic date, those relations evolved from the initial high temperature, euphoria, and romantic phase, when their close future was seen as joint, through sudden estrangement and open disputes, up to a near freezing point, verging on animosity. So, those relations, instead of being friendly and neighborly, are now rather encumbered with mistrust and disputes.

At the beginning of the way into independence—in the struggle to crush Yugoslavia to and self-liberation, and later also in the first days of independence—Croatia and Slovenia gave the impression of a well-harmonized rowing crew (without a cox) that skillfully rowed, and dodged around dangerous obstacles on the Kupa, that is Kolpa [in Slovene], and the Sutla, that is Sotla [in Slovene], rivers (these two form the border between these neighboring countries). However, the crew fell apart, and two rowers took separate ways. Such an outcome was largely influenced by the Yugoslav, that is the Serbian, aggression, at first against Slovenia, than against Croatia, and finally against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The war brought about a drastically different situation for the two young states: It disconnected their destinies, showed them the differences in their interests, and introduced more problems and disputes that originate from former Yugoslavia, but the majority of them were still prompted by the new situation, and the historical fact that Croatia and Slovenia had become independent states. That imposed an obligation and responsibility on the newly constituted authorities to settle independently the many difficult problems that are not identical in both states. Those problems are certainly much more difficult in Croatia because of the consequences of the war.

Unfortunately, Slovenia failed to show enough understanding, patience, and solidarity with these problems, while Croatia, perhaps unjustifiably, expected too much from its neighbor. So that in the course of 1992 Croato-Slovene relations dramatically cooled and deteriorated. This last year, 1993, in which various negotiations on different levels were held, is also over, but still it did not bring about any more considerable steps forward, although on several occasions it appeared that a dramatic turn toward an improvement of relations in general, as well as on individual points, was almost at hand.

This refers to the following event: After the meetings between Slovene President Kucan and his Croatian counterpart Tudjman (on the hill of Brdo kod Kranja in October 1992), between [foreign ministers] Lojze Peterle and Skrabalo (in the town of Otocec na Krki in February 1993), and between Peterle and Mate Granic (in Bizeljsko, October 1993), both sides were issuing quite optimistic statements to the effect that almost all the problems had been solved, and that the signing of a whole series of agreements would follow that were quite important for the establishment of neighborly and friendly relations. However, on each of the three occasions everything stopped. One gets the impression, at least from a

brief insight in the development of mutual relations, that in 1993 no considerable progress came about. Does that mean that the past year was yet another lost year?

This first impression is deceptive, however. The worst and most critical period seems to have been surmounted: The precipitating decline of Croat-Slovene relations has been halted, and they have entered a phase of "a return to reality." The two individuals on the Kupa and Sutla rivers will probably never form a rowing team again, but now they are at least trying not to disturb the water, and to row without colliding with each other or capsizing. Anglers and swimmers on the Croatian bank of the Kupa River can be at ease again: For the time being they do not have to fear that the former's bait would hit another part of the river, or that the latter would not be allowed to swim across it. The two individuals on the Kupa and Sutla rivers are quite well personified by two people with whom we talkedh: Matija Malesic, Slovene ambassador to Zagreb, and Smiljan Simac, aide of the Croatian foreign minister, who is responsible for relations with European countries. Both of them, in separate talks with DANAS, tried to cool the game down, and to keep the ball somewhat lower. To the assessment that the 1993 was yet another lost year, that nothing remarkable happened in Croato-Slovene relations, both Malesic and Simac categorically denied it: No, that is not true!

On that occasion they gave two pieces of evidence that relations are still improving. First, so far a total of seven agreements, contracts, protocols, and annexes have been signed. It is not so striking a number, and they do not deal with any of more important issues that are still being disputed and are still muddying the waters of the Kupa and Sutla rivers. Yet, it is proof that the neighbors have finally accepted the principle that problems are to be solved step by step. And that is a more reliable way than dealing with all the problems at once, in packages. Or to put it symbolically: The two individuals are harmonizing their courses.

All the more since, second, the meetings on different political and expert levels are constantly taking place, at which, also step by step, the sides are trying to remove obstacles and reach agreements. Reportedly, several important agreements have already been prepared: On cultural cooperation, employment, health security, and railroad communications. For that reason both Malesic and Simac speak of a standstill in mutual relations, rather than a deterioration. Still, they dare not make any forecasts when a radical breakthrough from that standstill could be made. Obviously, the existing disputes are still difficult and there are no considerable signs of optimism, but, therefore, realistic thinking seems to be firmly established.

[Box, pp 38-39]

In the entire history of Croat-Slovene relations the toughest realist, with traces of pessimism, seems to be Dr. Radovan Pavic, an eminent geo-strategist and geo-politician, who saw Slovenia as early as last spring as a potential barrier to Croatia's land connections with Central, northern, and Western Europe. This professor from Zagreb believes that Croatia and Slovenia, in view of their economic structures and geographic positions, can be nothing but permanent rivals, even after a possible settlement of the majority of problems is made. Still, according to Pavic, only good will can reduce all of that to the most civil relations possible.

And, as we have seen, good will exists on both sides. From the brief insight into the documents prepared by Zagreb and Ljubljana for the new round of negotiations, perhaps even for those at the highest level, one gets the impression that a considerable number of problems in mutual relations have been surmounted. Still, several disputed issues are still hampering relations. Those are territorial-border, economic-proprietary, and communications issues regarding the territory between the Slovene coastal town of Piran and the nuclear power station of Krsko.

The bay of Piran. The border disputes have been settled in 95 percent of the cases, mostly by following the principle of natural borders (like the Kupa and Sutla rivers), and the so-called land registry districts. One dispute has remained unsettled: the destiny of the bay of Piran. Or more precisely, the sea border is disputed. Croatia has accepted that the border along the St. Odorik Channel at the mouth of the Dragonja River should be determined according to the international practice of equidistance. However, in that case sovereignty over the bay is shared, and Slovenia loses the approach to the open seas. Although Croatia is offering a whole range of privileges regarding shipping and fishing, the Slovenes would like to have control over the entire bay, as they did in the times of the former Yugoslavia.

The Sentilj-Zagreb highway. That route is of vital importance for Croatia, as well as for some other European countries. It should be constructed as soon as possible in cooperation with Slovenia, given the foreign (Austrian) investment. However, the Slovenes consider their priority to be the route from Koper via Ljubljana via Celje to the Hungarian border, and for the time being they are not likely to satisfy Croatian interests. On the other hand, Zagreb is linking the issue with the settlement of the dispute over the Piran bay.

Economic and proprietary-legal relations. A whole string of unsettled proprietary problems is tightly bound up with the standstill and even decline of economic and business cooperation. In just one year, for instance, Croatian exports to Slovenia have dropped by 35 percent, whereas Slovene exports to Croatia have dropped by 25 percent. For such a situation one of the factors responsible is the disputed method of payment in exchange between these two countries, but agreement has also been made difficult by many unsettled proprietary-legal relations, or to be more precise, the unclear destiny of state-ownership, from the Slovene resorts on the Adriatic coast to Ljubljanska Banka.

The Krsko nuclear power station. Slovenia has recently dismissed 19 Croatian employees, and threatened the suspension of the delivery of power from Krsko to Croatia, because Zagreb has not yet paid its debts. However, the Slovene Government also owes money to Krsko, whereas the ownership of Krsko is shared between Slovenia and Croatia in a 50-50 relationship. The dispute might end up in the International Court.

HDZ Presents Military Strategic Plan

94P20198A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 Dec 93 p 6

[Article by Kresimir Meler and Branka Horvatek: "Development Plan for Croatian Army"]

[Text] Croatia should develop one of the strongest, if not the strongest, army in southeast Europe within 10 years. It will also incorporate a rapid deployment unit, which will, "if necessary, defend Croatian interests and the Croatian minority on all territories of the former Yugoslavia." As of now, this is only a proposal by a group of generals and politicians who belong to the rightist, radical fraction of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. Considering the present situation of the Croatian Armed Forces and the HDZ itself, it is quite realistic that these plans will actually be carried out. With rare exceptions, the Croatian Army General Staff and the commanding officers in the brigades consist of members of the ruling party who could, even if the ruling party were to be replaced, carry out the policy of their party unopposed, or even prevent the winning party from taking office.

What kind of future does the "Development Plan for the Croatian Armed Forces" foresee? As stated, "the present unstable political-military situation in southeastern Europe will continue in the coming years, maybe for the whole decade."

According to all available data, the situation in the parts of the country where the Serbian population is in the majority will not normalize. Serbia will continue to supply these areas with large amounts of weapons, and the threat of terrorist groups must be taken into account. Having a border with a possible Muslim state, which could cut through the territory of the Republic of Croatia, thereby hampering a free flow of people and goods, presents military and security problems. Moreover, the border with the present FRY will be extremely difficult to control. In the future, this border will have to remain a concern of highest priority. Along its most critical points it will have to be reinforced with heavy armored, motorized, and special airborne forces.

Acting as a constant destabilizing factor, the so-called FRY will probably continue "to lay claim not only to some parts of the Republic of Croatia but also to the territory of other states formed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia."

Given this assessment of the situation, it was only to be expected that the plan would propose "the gradual formation of an army that will be capable not only of protecting its borders if attacked from outside, but also of launching strong counterattacks on enemy's positions on enemy's territory, as well as pre-emptive strikes on enemy bases near the Croatian border. The Croatian Armed Forces must be ready in the future to respond quickly to protect ethnic Croats who live outside of the borders of the Republic of Croatia."

According to the planning being done by the Croatian generals, the Croatian Army should focus on acquiring U.S. military hardware or on cooperation with countries that produce weapons and equipment under U.S. license. If all these plans are fulfilled, the U.S. armament industry should prosper. Croatia plans to purchase 210 Phantom aircraft of various models. The first delivery will replace 40 MiG-21 and Jastreb aircraft. The Croatian Air Force plans to replace them in the next two years.

The remaining aircraft would be purchased over the next five years. There are also detailed plans regarding helicopters. The Croatian Government has already bought 10 MD-500 helicopters made under U.S. license in South Korea. Argentina manufactures missiles and machine guns for these helicopters. They are highly maneuverable. They can be also equipped with a submarine detector, TOW laser-guided antitank rockets, Martin Pescador air-to-ground missiles (to destroy radar systems), double lasers for Stinger missiles, two torpedos, a GE six-barrel mobile 7.62-mm minigun, a Hydra 70 launcher for 70-mm tracer bullets, and an infrared decoy emitter device. Half of these helicopters are already flying with HVO [Croatian Defense Council] markings. The total should reach approximately 100 in four years, in addition to a larger number of transport helicopters and aircraft.

Croatia would also like to buy radar and missile systems, leopard tanks, and long-range artillery made in the United States or under U.S. license. To reduce costs, individual parts would be produced in Croatia—difficult to accomplish considering the technological capacities of Croatian industry. The Army will receive an appropriation equal to 45 percent of the state budget, or about $1.3 billion. Over the next five years at least, the Army would receive 36.7 percent of the supplemental revenue derived from taxes on all goods and services. Consequently, Croatia would have to take out loans, which will in turn require forming strategic alliances with certain countries.

It is against this background that one should interpret Croatian defense minister's proposal that Zemunik airport be turned into a U.S. military base for the operations throughout southeast Europe, that the Rijeka shipyard be made available for repair services for the Sixth Fleet, and that U.S. Navy ships be given permanent docking privileges in any Croatian port they choose.

Croatian military strategy would be a complete—maybe slightly modified—copy of the Israeli defense system.

The toughest problem (although the Croatian authorities will not admit it) will be officer training. So far, Croatia does not have a satisfactory educational system at all. It is a fact that it lacks military secondary schools, let alone a military academy or so-called military colleges, in which the cadets could acquire know-how to advance to the highest military ranks. There is a shortage of senior officers. Moreover, only a few generals would be capable of passing a rigorous exam, with the exception of those that came over from the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. However, there are only very few of them and they have been kept inactive for now.

Another option would be training abroad, limited to the United States or to countries that buy the weapons from the United States or its licensees. The "unsolved problems with the western neighbor and Italy" are also mentioned, which inevitably leads to the question of whether the Balkans is going to eventually wind up with another unpredictable "Balkan policeman."

Police, Safety, Relations With Bosnia Viewed

AU1101103594 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jan 94 pp 6-8

[Interview with Ivan Jarnjak, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia, by Marko Barisic; place and date not given: "Serbs Do Not Feel Like Leaving Croatia"]

[Text] There are many reasons for an interview with Mr. Ian Jarnjak, who was the mayor of Krapina and the deputy minister of internal affairs before becoming the minister of internal affairs. There have recently been so many events that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has to say something about, they cannot fit into an interview. We first asked Minister Jarnjak to assess safety in the Republic of Croatia.

[Jarnjak] It has been noticed that the number of the most serious crimes, such as murders, terrorist actions, or planting of bombs and explosives, has dropped compared to 1992. We are happy about this and wish to highlight it as the main characteristic of 1993. We can say that safety is better than in the previous years. Clearly, there has also been less war conflict. It must be pointed out that we have had two tourist seasons, in which not even the slightest incident has occurred, so that we can say that Croatia is a stable low-risk country. The remark made by the Italian minister of internal affairs during the meeting in Italy in June 1993 that Italian citizens know that Croatia is safer than Italy is interesting in this context.

[Barisic] Still, some towns are more dangerous than others, Split for example.

[Jarnjak] The Ministry of Internal Affairs makes a list of everything that happens in the country every month. Based on this information we plan our actions and personnel changes, if necessary. After we had discussed these monthly reports we realized that the situation in Split is worse than the Croatian average, which was the signal for us to respond to this situation. The first thing we did was to improve the personnel structure. We took a series of measures, among other things we dismissed the then chairman of the Police Department for Split and Dalmatia, but the new one did not achieve the expected results, either. Then we brought a third man and gave him until the end of 1993 as a deadline to create order. We also took preventive and repressive actions, we brought several hundred policemen from other parts of Croatia to Split to help their colleagues, especially at border crossings and in Dubrovnik. After that, 500 new policemen came to help establish order. Split is a distinct area from many aspects, primarily because of refugees, but living in the city no longer entails any great risk, but is like any other town in Croatia. I think that safety in Split is improving and that it will soon be above the Croatian average.

[Barisic] What do you think about the border between Croatia and Herceg-Bosna as far as smuggling and economic crimes are concerned?

[Jarnjak] This is a very complex question. As the deputy minister of internal affairs, I met with representatives of the Croatian communes in Bosnia-Herzegovina as far back as 1991. We discussed this problem and reached the agreement—according to the proposal by President Tudjman—to establish some kind of border because the Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovia kept on buying various goods, especially gasoline, in Croatia. That kind of border was not a problem for honest people, but smuggling developed into a big problem here. Legal stipulations favored it since the taking of goods to Herceg-Bosna was treated as a classic export, which could not be controlled. After this stipulation became ineffective, this border became like any other; the crime is here no bigger than at any other border crossing.

It was at this border that we achieved good cooperation between the police, the customs and the finance police. I think that we have established good cooperation with Mr. Prlic, the prime minister of Herceg-Bosna, and with Mr. Coric, the minister of internal affairs, by a recent agreement, which is already showing the first results. This is now a flexible, open border, but nevertheless everything is under control.

[Barisic] What are relations between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and the institutions of Herceg-Bosna like?

[Jarnjak] The Ministry of Internal Affairs and, I dare say, me, as the minister, did everything we could to help our Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina defend themselves. We are now helping them in organizing their police from the point of view of logistics, personnel and organization. We visited the border crossings in 1991 and talked to the people who are now high-ranking officials in Herceg-Bosna about the preparation of the defense strategy. I informed Mr. Tudjman on these talks and asked him to help us define the best way to help

them. The president supported our ideas so we founded a training center, and this was visited by Croats from the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We made a program in the Ministry of Internal Affairs that included an 11-day course organized in Makarska. This program can be compared to a spider's web; several people who wanted to become local commanders in their Croatian place in Bosnia attended the course. They were taught to organize themselves and make units. I would like to point out that these courses were organized as early as 1991—while there was peace there. Approximately 1,500 people attended these courses. They have been in charge of the defense of Herceg-Bosna from the very beginning. When the first group completed the course and went to Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were sworn in by Mate Boban on behalf of Herceg-Bosna, and by me on behalf of Croatia.

These courses were secret because these people were not to be discovered. I told you all these things to show you that our cooperation dates back to 1991. I would like to add that we did not interfere with the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state; we simply did not want to allow Croatian regions to remain unprepared for defense.

[Barisic] What do you think about the documents published in the press accusing Tomislav Mercep, an adviser at the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

[Jarnjak] I do not think that he is being charged with something, he is only being accused, because he can be charged with something only by the attorney general. It is correct that during the investigation of the murder in the Zec family some people made very broad statements and told us things we did not know before. The collected material was forwarded to the Office of the Attorney General. The outcome of the trial for murder is well known, but we as the Ministry of Internal Affairs have no right and we do not want to comment on decisions made by courts. After I read the article in GLOBUS, I first tried to find out whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs gave any kind of information about this case and asked the Ministry employees to make written reports. I learned that the Zagreb Police Department reported on this case in the second half of December 1991 at the request of the Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, and there are documents about it. We wrote our report in three copies: One was left at the Zagreb Police Department, and two were forwarded to the aforementioned office. The complete case was submitted to the attorney general for further procedure. This means that the police accomplished its part of the task.

As far as concerns the question how our report reached the public, I have to say that I examined the Ministry employees; all persons who could have somehow had access to the report, or had any knowledge on it, were asked to make written reports. They stated, with moral and financial accountability, that none of them enabled anybody to come to this information.

[Barisic] Does this mean that this information leaked out from the Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order?

[Jarnjak] I do not know where the information came from, but I would like to point out that according to written reports it did not come out from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Should it be proven during the investigation that one of the Ministry employees made a false statement, the consequences are clear, regardless of who this person is. The Ministry of Internal Affairs will not tolerate the removal of documents marked as "state secret." I would like to stress—no matter who this person is. Not because the public should not be informed, but because the case has been handled by the attorney general, in which case the Ministry of Internal Affairs can be involved only upon order of the attorney general if necessitated by some additional information. From this point of view it is clear that Ministry employees are not allowed to bring information into circulation. These are the facts and the genesis of the whole case.

Personally, I think that the person who spread this information did not have good intentions. If he wanted to stimulate the functioning of the constitutional state, it would have been enough if he had told the attorney general and judicial authorities to handle the case, since the attorney general is not obliged to accept all information received from the police. For this reason there is a division of power into the executive, judicial and legislative. I think that the attorney general should have responded and stated whether there was material for bringing a charge against Mercep or not. We do not want to protect anybody, but nobody can be blackened by information at a point when the deed has not yet been proven. It is also bad to pull this case out of the context of 1991 and look at it from the perspective of 1993. I do not want to excuse the committed crimes, the law has to be respected, but the law has to respected also as far as the spreading of confidential information is concerned. I shall always support correct work. We know which institutions could have treated this case and which we could have contacted if we wanted to do Croatia good. I think that the person who spread this information did no good either to the individuals connected with this case or to the state. I condemn such methods.

[Barisic] How many applications for Croatian citizenship were refused and why?

[Jarnjak] We received 527,581 applications, and 25,493 applications were rejected, mostly because the formal conditions were not met. It is important to know that numerous people came to Croatia as refugees and that many of them asked for Croatian citizenship. It is clear that the applicants who have not lived in Croatia for at least five years were refused. A small number of applicants were refused for other reasons, so that the number of negative applications is not that big taking into consideration the total number of applications.

[Barisic] The Serbian People's Party constantly stresses, however, that the Serbs have problems in obtaining Croatian citizenship.

[Jarnjak] Whenever the Serbian People's Party asked us for an explanation in a case, we reconsidered it and responded. I cannot speak in general about dissatisfaction because there are examples that some associations submitted lists consisting of 150 people who were allegedly refused Croatian citizenship, and more than half of them never asked for it. For this reason I cannot accept general accusations of the type that Serbs, for example, have problems with it. Also Croats have problems. Very indicative is the following information. Up to now 2,483 Croats have asked to renounce their Croatian citizenship, whereas only 82 Serbs have made such an application. There are rumors that the Serbs do not feel like leaving Croatia, and I can say that there are no significant reasons why they should feel like leaving Croatia. This is a sign that the constitutional state is functioning.

You have to admit that it was not easy to solve all these cases in one or two years. The Ministry of Internal Affairs worked in four shifts, day and night, we entered all applicants into the computer (we have the data stored on diskettes no v); we created a data base for Croatia. Some data still have to be checked, but we have a data base. At the beginning people had to wait for a long time for their documents, but we do not have this problem any more. It is normal that there are people who cannot obtain Croatian citizenship. There is not such a state in the world that would give everybody citizenship. In some states people wait for years. Admittedly, it is a special situation, but I have to repeat that in most cases only those applicants were refused who did not fulfill the basic conditions. These people are entitled to appeal before the Administrative Court. If this court makes a positive decision, we carry it out immediately.

[Barisic] What is the national structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs employees?

[Jarnjak] There are 93 percent Croats, 4.7 percent Serbs, 1.3 Muslims and 1 percent others.

[Barisic] This structure will probably change if Manolic's proposal that members of Martic's units enter the Croatian police is accepted.

[Jarnjak] Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality will join the Croatian police; not every applicant, only those who meet the criteria established by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This means that they will have to pass certain tests. We cannot accept a criminal or a person who has already been convicted. Apart from that, Croatian policemen are required to have appropriate education. Not everybody is entitled to be a Croatian policeman. These criteria will be applied to future policemen of the Serbian nationality. Nobody can be admitted without having fulfilled these conditions, otherwise the professional level of the Croatian police could fall below the level we need.

[Barisic] The administrative law on the rights of minorities provides the possibility of autonomous police in Glina and Knin.

[Jarnjak] We are prepared to organize also these police forces, we have established police departments in these communes and we have plans on how to organize the work in the police stations in all the places that should have them: Petrinja, Glina, Knin, Topusko, Vukovar, Beli Manastir, Okucani.... When the conditions are met, we shall organize the police's work there: border control, maintenance of law and order as well as all the other tasks that the Croatian police has to perform. According to the administrative law from 1991 the police forces in these places should be formed according to the national structure of the population. We shall respect this law.

[Barisic] Which international organizations was the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Croatia admitted to and what is the cooperation with these organizations like?

[Jarnjak] We were only interested in Interpol, which we joined in 1992. Our cooperation with Interpol members is good and useful. Interpol works according to the principle that the member states within an area sign bilateral agreements on cooperation in the prevention of crime in general. We have signed such an agreement with Slovenia, Italy, Hungary, Ukraine, and Albania. Apart from that, we have signed a protocol with Slovakia. Now we have to sign such agreements with other close countries, such as Austria, Germany and others. The everyday cooperation with close countries is good, especially in stamping out organized crime. We have already had several successes in actions with the police of the neighboring countries.

[Barisic] What is cooperation like with the police of the Muslim part of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Can you comment on the rumors that Zagreb is the largest logistics base for the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is fiercely attacking the Croatian enclaves in Central Bosnia?

[Jarnjak] From time to time the Croatian police checks the work of humanitarian organizations as possible logistics centers. The people who work there must have legal status in Croatia, in order to prevent illegal acts or crime that could affect the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia. There might be various rumors, but these are the facts.

[Barisic] What are the priority tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the next period?

[Jarnjak] We have the necessary personnel and the technical equipment now. We shall now have to solve the problem of our facilities, because our police stations and even department offices do not have appropriate accommodation. As far as other priorities are concerned, we shall especially insist on the high quality of police work. We shall work on the further education of our staff. Further on, we shall have to improve the discipline, there must be no incidents whatsoever. In short, we shall make our police professional; the Croatian policeman must be

a correct and kind professional, loyal to his state and his people, regardless of his working conditions and the place in which he works.

Article Views Tudjman's Son as Security Chief

AU1101104694 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Dec 93 pp 3,4

[Article by Fran Visnar: "Powerful Son of a Powerful Father"]

[Excerpt] After the reconstruction of the Croatian security and intelligence services in November this year [1993], foreigners residing in Croatia for very particular (surveillance) purposes noted the following questions in their operational diaries: Considering the size of Croatia, does it need so many intelligence services, which creates unnecessary duplication in civilian and military structures? Is this organization of services, which is actually inert and bulky, a reflection of the democratic face of the Croatian authorities, or is this nevertheless the seamy side of a regime that displays all the hallmarks of a police state?

The Number of Services Is Not Too High

Although it would be interesting to see what the foreign intelligence officers wrote in their reports in reply to the questions they asked, their opinion, for the time being, is not available for public scrutiny, not even in countries from which they originate. We will, therefore, attempt to supply some answers on our own and dispel at least some of the mystification about the regrouping of the Croatian intelligence and security apparatus.

In the past three years, Croatia as a sovereign country, in addition to the army, has also created its own police force, as well as the security services without which no independent country in the world can function. Considering that Croatia is still involved in a very complex conflict with Serbia and local rebel Serbs, and is significantly involved in the war still raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina—the number of Croatian intelligence services is not too high.

However, something else is more important in this matter. In countries with a developed intelligence and security apparatus and parliamentary democracy, it is very important who controls the entire system, whether it has 500 or 20,000 intelligence officers and security clerks. Specialized parliamentary commissions and committees can definitely not do this. They only serve as a kind of occasional democratic inspection. Consequently, within an intelligence system, there is always an internal watch dog, taken from that walk of life and appointed as main supervisor, that is, the controller of all the intelligence and security agencies. In Croatia, after Manolic's official era, the HIS [Croatian Information Service] had that function, and not Sarinic's UNS [Office for National Security] (an advisory body to the Croatian president).

What disturbs the world is that Miroslav Tudjman, the son of Franjo Tudjman, has been appointed head of the HIS. That is usually seen in undemocratic political systems, Arabian sheikdoms, or in openly autocratic dictatorial regimes. In Syria, President Assad appointed his brother controller of all the civilian and military intelligence and counterintelligence services and he has held that position for decades. In Rumania, Nicu Ceausescu, the omnipotent son of his father—the dictator—was the same. In North Korea, Kim Il Sung trusts only his own son Kim Il Yong, who maintains strict discipline and party rule in the huge apparatus of the state security (115,000 people).

The West Is Sensitive to That

The West is really sensitive to this. In Great Britain, there would be a crisis in the cabinet if the queen asked the prime minister to appoint her brother or her son as the main controller of the board of directors that supervises British intelligence services MI5, MI6, DIS, and GCHQ. In Israel, in that case there would be a quarrel in the Knesset and new elections. In Germany, something like that would be taken as a good joke, and in France, Sweden, and Italy, as a dangerous political move and precedent.

In our case, the unpleasantness of such a comparison may be alleviated by the knowledge of the balance of political forces not only in the state but also in the ruling HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. Of several candidates, Miroslav Tudjman is presently the best choice for the head of HIS. In addition to having successfully, and in a scientific manner, studied the principles of information society [previous two words printed in bold type], Miroslav Tudjman's elitist humanist education gives him the following advantage in relation to his competition (of course, all of whom were members of the HDZ): He has modern thoughts and is not inferior to those he commands (and controls) and, more important for this job, he never publicly asserts his personal views. No Gojko Susak [minister of defense] will be able to afford to ignore (as during the era of coordinator Manolic) the opinion of the new head of the HIS, who also has high formal authority in the field of national security.

For that function, Miroslav Tudjman is a better solution than Hrvoje Sarinic, who is, on the other hand, ideal for the job of principal adviser in the president's cabinet, and not for the keeper of the key who can put into motion or halt such an expensive and sensitive organization as the national intelligence system. The UNS will now function exactly as was originally planned—as an national security advisory office of the head of state (something that exists in most Western democratic systems), and not as an independent intelligence agency superior to everyone.

We also have to consider something else. Miroslav Tudjman is an intellectual who has been developing a social-democratic profile for years. That means that the

head of the HIS will not be an inexperienced, but aggressive hawk that will kill everyone in the hen house to take but one hen as its prey. In other words: He will assert his authority through his knowledge and fierce professional debate (which is a common practice in intelligence methodology), and not by intolerance and bureaucratic court games; he will stimulate mutual cooperation and not rivalry in the Croatian intelligence community. Those who pretend to his position and advocate the so called hard line in the HDZ, whose philosophy of life naturally contains nepotism and connections, will carefully consider whether it pays directly or indirectly to attack someone who is, after all, the son of the president (both of the party and of the state).

And there is another thing, which commentaries in the Croatian and international press have neglected to point out, on the occasion of Miroslav Tudjman's appointment to the position of the head of HIS: The military and civilian security and intelligence system in Croatia will, in future, act within its legal province. The SIS [Security and Information Service], conceived as a military [last word printed in bold type] counterintelligence service, will remain firmly in the domain of the army and army barracks (it cannot go beyond that area), while the VOS [Military Intelligence Service] will continue to do his job: procuring and analyzing intelligence data of military and strategic importance.

Double-Faced Coat

The head of the HIS is to see to that this limit is not exceeded, that authorizations and information are not intertwined, and that rivalry is reduced to the minimum. The reconstruction of the Croatian intelligence security apparatus also shows that the intelligence capability of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will definitely have to improve, while a good part of the remaining field in the Croatian intelligence community will be plowed exclusively by the SZUP—the (civilian) Service for Protecting the Constitutional System. If there are any doubts as to why the SIS exists at all, there should be no doubts as to the purpose of the SZUP. That service could even change its name (a common practice in, for example, Germany for similar agencies), but one should nevertheless admit that this is a security organization that is, technologically and professionally speaking, the strongest and the most professional in Croatia, because of one small advantage: In addition to continued counterintelligence and antiterrorist operational activities, it can also serve as an intelligence organization against its opponents. The SZUP is, therefore, like a reversible coat—on one side it has a standard (civilian) color, and on the other camouflage.

Still, do we really need so many security services? Bearing in mind several external and internal factors, the question is equal to the dilemma of the Croatian citizen earning 10 million Croatian dinars a month asking: "Must I pay tax?" [passage omitted]

Nuclear Plant To Cut Electricity to Croatia

AU1001161294 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 10 Jan 93

[Text] After Krsko nuclear power station is reconnected to the Slovene energy system—this is expected within 24 hours—Croatia will not longer receive electricity from Krsko. In Zagreb, they assessed this measure of the Slovene Economic Ministry as an unprecedented ultimatum and called for negotiations. Irena Majce reports:

[Begin Majce recording] Minister Dr. Maks Tajnikar, therefore, kept his promise. His pronouncement that after this synchronization Croatia will no longer receive electricity from Krsko is about to materialize in the next few hours. At least, this is what the minister asserted this morning.

The station is expected to receive the final permission for operation today. Following the second request of the power station regarding the modification of chlorine detection, the Republican Directorate for Nuclear Safety concluded that the problem could be temporarily resolved by two hand-operated portable monitors. The ordered and already paid for automatic sensors are expected to arrive in Krsko within six to eight weeks. By extending another two decrees until the halt this summer, the power station now meets the conditions to resume operation. It is expected that it will operate normally, that is to say, it will gradually, with interim tests, reach its 100 percent capacity.

Half of the electricity, that is, over 7 million kwh per day, that Krsko has so far produced for Croatia will now be partially used at home while the rest will be exported abroad, that is, to those who will pay for it.

Minister Tajnikar communicated this in a special letter to his Croatian colleague last week and added that the neighboring country will be able to get electricity again after 26 January, but only on the condition that it settles its debts by 19 January.

Zagreb, in its letter to Ljubljana today, replied that such a measure, which they call an ultimatum, could have grave political and material consequences. They, therefore, reject it, with the proposal that all open questions connected to the nuclear power station be negotiated between the states in a package, and not merely the finances.

Minister Tajnikar reiterated today that Slovenia will insist on payment for electricity and that it is initially willing to negotiate on finances only, and on other questions once the financial issues are settled. Most of other issues are supposedly already regulated by Slovene legislation, with the exception of property transformation, regarding which the government has not taken a stance yet.

Croatian Energy Secretary Vladimir Kramberger believes that the problem lies precisely in property transformation because he believes that Slovenia is avoiding the preparation of new interstate documents about the power station because it would like to take it over entirely.

Croatia still owes 38 million German Marks to Krsko, after it has paid altogether 2 million German Marks on Friday and Monday. Slovenia has settled all of its obligations prior to this change of fuel. [end recording]

Military Intelligence Chief Lovsin Resigns

AU1001170694 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 7 Jan 93 p 1

["C. R."-signed report: "VOMO Director Andrej Lovsin Resigns"]

[Text] Ljubljana 6 January—Andrej Lovsin today stopped working as the director of the Security Organ of the Defense Ministry [VOMO]. At his own request, the government at today's session relieved him of his duty as undersecretary in the Defense Ministry, a statement by the Defense Ministry says.

Lovsin started his military career in the former Yugoslavia as an officer of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army. Upon his release from the Yugoslav Peoples' Army in 1985 he took up employment in the Slovene Secretariat for Internal Affairs, and after independence in June 1991, took up the post of the chief of the military intelligence service. Under his leadership the service rather successfully dodged parliamentary supervision, while Lovsin himself was involved in the controversial kidnapping of two Greek arms merchants in Austria.

The failure and disclosure of this action gave rise to hints about VOMO's encroachment upon the authorities of the civilian intelligence service and its appetites for control over the civilian sphere, which led to the affair of VIS [Security-Information Service] versus VOMO. On that occasion, Lovsin offered his resignation from the post of the chief of the military intelligence service for the first time, however, Defense Minister Janez Jansa did not accept it. Lately, Lovsin's name again rocked the public in connection with the B.P. case, that is to say, the affair involving the Adit and Safti [companies].

Federal

Supreme Defense Council Holds Session

LD1001182394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1745 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Jan (TANJUG)—A session of the Supreme Defense Council was held in Belgrade today. It was presided over by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to the members of the Supreme Defense Council—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic—the session was also attended by Federal Vice Premier Jovan Zebic, Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, and Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel General Momcilo Perisic.

The Supreme Defense Council examined the issue of material reserves, and developing and supplying the Yugoslav Army with equipment in light of implementing its constitutional duty to defend the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the military office of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has announced.

Sainovic, British Officials Discuss Sanctions

LD1001223894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2221 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, January 10 (TANJUG)—The sanctions imposed by the international community against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia do not help restore peace in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and secure an equal treatement for all the three confronted sides there, Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Nikola Sainovic said on Monday [10 January]. He said this during talks with three British MPs who are currently visiting Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb republic, the Republican Ministry of Information said in a statement.

In May 1992, the United Nations Security Council imposed tough sanctions against the Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro because of their alleged involvement in the civil war among Moslems, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The allegation that only Serbia is responsible for the war in Bosnia is not correct, one of the British MPs, Nigel Evans, said in an interview to Serbian Television after the meeting with Sainovic. He also said he would present this view to the British Government.

The talks focused on the effects of the sanctions and the possibilities for unhindered and speedier delivery of British humanitarian medical supplies to Yugoslavia, he said. We are especially interested in working in that direction after our visits to hospitals where we saw the effects of the sanctions, Evans said.

Government Passes Temporary Budget for Jan-Mar

LD1001173794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1614 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Jan (TANJUG)—The federal government met today and discussed and passed a decree on providing temporary financing for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the period of January-March 1994, the federal Ministry of Information reports in a statement. The session was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic.

As the conditions have not been fulfilled for this year's federal budget to be adopted by the Federal Assembly by the end of the year, and in order not to threaten the most vital functions of the federal state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Government passed an act on a temporary budget for the first quarter of the year.

This will make it possible to secure resources to finance the work of the Army of Yugoslavia and the fedaral administration bodies, pay war veteran's pensions and social security, provide social security for refugees and for the population on the territories under the control of the UN peacekeeping forces, the statement says.

Kontic Receives New Head of Observer Mission

LD1001153694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1306 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Jan (TANJUG)—[Yugoslav] Federal Prime Minister Dr. Radoje Kontic received Konstantin Gorokostapulos [name as received], head of the EU observer mission for the former Yugoslavia, who took over this post on 1 January. During the meeting it was stressed that it is vital to do everything to end the conflicts in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina peacefully as soon as possible. It was pointed out that the EU mission could play a significant role in this connection, above all by interpreting events in the area of the former Yugoslavia objectively. To this end the Federal Government and federal bodies will offer all necessary assistance to the EU mission.

Interest was expressed on both sides in the closest possible cooperation between the Federal Government and federal organs and the EU mission, the statement of the Federal Information Ministry says in conclusion.

Albanian Killed by Army Guards at Border

LD1001161694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1520 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Jan (TANJUG)—The information service of the Yugoslav Army's Third Army [as received] has said in a statement that at 1350 today a new border incident took place near the Morina border watch-tower on the border with Albania. The incident was caused by the Albanian side. Yugoslav Army border guards killed an Albanian citizen, who had tried illegally to cross the

border and had refused to obey their orders, on FRY territory. Competent investigating officers have been sent to the scene of the killing in order to establish all the circumstances relating to the killing of the person who tried illegally to cross the border, the statement concludes.

Serbia

Djindjic Predicts New Elections 'Soon'

AU1001154894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Zoran Djindjic, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party, stated that the new government of Serbia will not be formed, even though a compromise is possible, and that one should expect new elections to be called soon. Speaking at a news conference, he also said that the rift in the party will soon be resolved with the vote of no confidence in Dragoljub Micunovic, president of the Democratic Party. Srdjan Savic reports:

[Savic] The meeting of the Main Committee of the Democratic Party was interrupted early this morning because there was no quorum during the casting of the vote of confidence in the party president, Dragoljub Micunovic, Djindjic said. The session of the Main Committee will be resumed on Saturday [15 January] at which members will not make speeches, but only hold a vote of confidence in the party's president. The convening of the conference of the Democratic Party will also be on the agenda. There is no danger of yet another Democratic Party being formed, Djindjic said, stressing that the dispute with Micunovic is not personal and that they only have conceptual differences.

The president of the Executive Committee of the Democrats holds the view that the political life in Serbia represents the continuation of a chaos, that wages and pensions are not being paid because of the shortage of cash, and that the German mark is becoming the main unit of account. According to him, all this is being induced by the Government of the Republic of Serbia.

Djindjic stressed that the Democratic Party will not enter the government formed by the Socialists. He said that Sainovic's government will remain in office until the next elections, which should be expected soon. A compromise is nevertheless possible, and the next move should be made by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Socialist Party of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic concluded.

Macedonia

Commentary Examines Increased U.S. Interest

AU1001211394 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 8 Jan 94 p 2

[Commentary by Zoran Petrov: "Just a Strategic Determination"]

[Text] More than six months have passed since the Macedonian Government made its first official announcement on the possibility of joining NATO, along with the information that a request for admission to this military alliance was being sent. At that time, this piece of news was largely commented on because, as some military experts and defense theoreticians have emphasized, the security of the republic would be highly promoted with such an action. Since that time, the public has not been given any further official information about the fate of this initiative—whether the government ever discussed NATO membership again, whether the request for admission to the NATO Council was sent to Brussels, what the response was, or, in general, what the possibilities and chances are for Macedonia to join the treaty. In the meantime, a number of extremely important events occurred in Macedonia, which, in a way, overshadowed the NATO membership initiative. First, it was the arrival of the U.S. squadron from Berlin, which was placed under the command of UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces] in Macedonia, acting as a historical precedent to the previous practice of UN peacekeeping forces.

More importantly though is that, since May of last year, visits by U.S. political and army representatives have become more frequent—Congressmen Reid and Gingrich, Senators Lugar and Coverdell, the congressional delegation headed by Congressman Skelton, and several high army delegations. The whole matter was finally made official on 3 December with the opening of the U.S. Liaison Office in Skopje.

Expanded Mandate of the "Yankee"

The initiative for NATO membership has now been actualized by President Kiro Gligorov, who announced it as a strategic goal for this year in his pre-New Year address in the Macedonian Parliament. On the other hand, great attention was drawn to a statement made by UNPROFOR Commander Fin Saermark Thompsen a couple of months ago. Talking about the mission of the "blue helmets" in Macedonia and reiterating once again that their basic task was to observe and inform about everything that was happening on the Macedonian-Serbian border, accidentally or not, Thompsen stated that only the newly arrived U.S. soldiers in Macedonia had the right to resort to arms under his personal command. This practically means that the mandate of the peacekeeping forces has been exposed to changes, and even though the Nordic Battalion, as has been stated so many times before, has been excluded from any armed intervention, the same is not applied to the Americans either. Therefore, regardless of their symbolic number (approximately 300), the U.S. squadron that is operating under the flag of the United Nations in Macedonia has the right to not only observe and inform about what is happening on the border, but it also disposes of a "somewhat" expanded mandate regarding the mission.

This indicator bluntly coincides with the increased interest in Macedonia by the United States, which

started in May last year, after Bill Clinton stated that the United States would get involved in military actions in case Macedonia is attacked. In other words, the predictions about a discrete change in the UNPROFOR mandate and the expectations that the size of the U.S. contingent will soon be increased have been actualized.

The fact that the Bosnian conflict cannot be hidden by a glass bell and that its expansion cannot be impeded because one of the most natural characteristics of every war is its metastasis is the cause for Macedonia, whether it likes it or not, to be involved in the geographic and strategic maps as a region of high risk, gravitating objectively toward the shaking Bosnian region. In other words, Macedonia is a part of the general situation that is defined as unstable and unpredictable on the global plan and the expanded definition of the total situation in the boiling Balkans. Here we can look for the root of the sudden interest in Macedonia by the Americans, who clearly exposed their intentions in the whole region after entering the game as a military factor for solving the Bosnian conflict. Thus, the United States has, once again, not only demonstrated its resoluteness in realizing its fundamental interest in keeping a strategic stability in these regions, but also, as is usually pointed out by Western Europeans, because of "the fact that history has thrice taught us that the permanent presence of the United States in Europe is essentially desirable and fruitful." On the other hand, it is known that the initial urges of the Americans for a military intervention in the former Yugoslavia were met by strong reaction from the European allies, because the Americans themselves refuse to subordinate any part of their armed forces under the UN command. Here is where the present latent disunity between the previous allies lies, which is slowly and discretely affecting the exposed attempts for redefining the structures, goals, and authorities of the previously untouchable NATO.

The Smallest Evil Selected

It is certain that the Macedonian leadership has thought about all the possible alternatives and consequences in the greater cooperation with the United States.

The U.S. military presence in our country is the third solution of the dilemma—how to locate the security of Macedonia: whether to connect it with some of the neighbors by creating a military alliance (a dangerous alternative that would radically increase the pressures and aspirations toward our country) or to make up for the enormous lack in armament after the departure of the former Yugoslav National Army relying on its own forces (not only objectively, impossible alternative, but also in direct collision with the arms import embargo). Therefore, the only possibility left is to cooperate with a military force, which—emphasized by our state officials so many times before—does not have any historical aspirations toward this region—in other words, the United States.

As a matter of fact, in accepting the U.S. offer to send its troops, Macedonia has chosen the best solution, which certainly should not be treated as a complete guarantee for peace and stability in the country. This process will be thoroughly encompassed if Macedonia officially states its request and is admitted as a member of NATO. However, for the time being, the public has not been informed about such an action, although it is known that the Macedonian foreign minister has paid several visits to the NATO headquarters in Brussels. As a consequence, if we follow the recent steps of "refrain" and the gradual penetration of Macedonia into all international institutions and bodies, accompanied by its recent recognition by a great number of EU members, it is logical to expect that in this phase of the military plan, the main emphasis will be placed on the U.S. military presence in the state.

From a purely military aspect, the interest of the United States and NATO originates from the geographical and topographical definition of the central part of the Vardar corridor and certainly from the aspect of maintaining peace in the region. Here lie the clearly defined interests of a number of states for the former Yugoslav republics; therefore, Macedonia, directly or indirectly, has found itself in one of the zones defined as the sphere of U.S. interest and influence (together with Albania, Bulgaria, and certainly, Greece). In any case, it would be too ambitious and unreal to claim that Macedonia has definitely been placed under the U.S. umbrella. All the guarantees and elementary presumptions for safeguarding peace and security lie within Macedonia itself, in keeping its internal stability, particularly on the plan of interethnic relations and social peace.

Kosovo

Bukoshi Asks NATO To Deploy Peacekeepers

AU1001202794 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT Nr. 267 in English 10 Jan 94

[Unattributed report: "Prime Minister Bukoshi Urges NATO To Act on Kosova"—issued by the Democratic League of Kosova]

[Text] As the NATO Summit is due to convene today, prime minister of the republic of Kosova Dr. Bujar Bukoshi wrote a letter yesterday to the Portuguese Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva bringing to his attention "the continuing state of turmoil, human rights violations, and repression in the republic of Kosova," and requesting NATO to consider four specific actions while addressing the Kosova crisis.

"Without a prompt resolution of the Kosova problem and without an end to the abrogation of all human, civil, and national rights of the Albanians in Kosova, the Balkans will ultimately face the serious possibility of a devastating conflict which would not only obstruct the new NATO Partnership for Peace initiative, but would also affect the present structure of NATO itself," says the

letter, asking NATO use its influence to: redeploy international human rights monitors to Kosova; send peacekeeping forces to the region; keep international pressure on Serbia; and bring the perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice.

This letter together with a statement of the Kosova prime minister elaborating the need for action on Kosova were sent to all NATO-member heads of governments in Brussels.

Dr. Bujar Bukoshi said in the statement that "without a just solution to the Kosova problem, there can be no comprehensive settlement of the brutally aggressive Balkan conflict," adding that unless it is addressed as an international problem, it will "lead inevitably to an international conflict which will demand international action."

Prime minister Bukoshi offers a comprehensive account of the deteriorating situation in Kosova following the expulsion of Serbia of the CSCE mission to Kosova.

In face of the alarming situation in Kosova, prime minister Bukoshi urges NATO summit to consider four specific actions to address the problem "realistically and effectively." One is the redeployment of the international human rights monitors to Kosova, in compliance with the UN Security Council's resolution adopted last August. Second, Kosova prime minister asks for UN or NATO peacekeeping forces to be deployed in Kosova in order to avoid a massive bloodshed in face of the heavy Serbian military, paramilitary, and police build-up. Third, Dr. Bukoshi maintains that the "economic sanctions against Serbia must be kept in place," although as he says, "the people of Kosova suffer on two counts" from sanctions imposed on Kosova by Serbia itself and the international sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

[passage indistinct] the perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice. "Prompt and decisive action by the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal will do much to teach the criminal aggressors that such gross crimes against humanity will not go unpunished," says Dr. Bukoshi in his today's statement, adding that "failed policies of the past are no excuse for the failure to act in the present. The means to avert a Kosova calamity are clear. All that remains in the will of NATO and the international community to act."

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